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Negligence law is the central focus of modem tort law.1 Duty is the 
most fundamental aspect of a negligence problem. 2 Paradoxically, 
however, the nature of "duty" has been subject to substantial historical 
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. The author wishes to 
express appreciation to his research assistants, Lynn Holdsworth and Drake Buckman, 
whose diligence made this Article possible. And, special thanks to Jeremiah for 
allowing me to borrow so much of his mom's time. 
1. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of 
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992). 
2. See, e.g., Graveman v. Wind Drift Owner's Ass'n Inc, 607 So. 2d 199, 203 
(Ala. 1992) ("The existence of a duty to the plaintiff is fundamental to a negligence 
claim."); Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz. 1983) ("[a negligence action may 
be maintained only if there is a] duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the 
[defendant] to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risks."); First Insurance Co. of Haw., Ltd. v. International Harvester 
Co., 659 P.2d 64, 67 (Haw. 1983) ("Fundamental in any determination of liability for 
negligence is 'the existence of a duty owed by the ... [putative tortfeasor] to the ... 
[injured person]."') (citation omitted); Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., 9 Cal. 
App. 4th 88, 114, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 484 (1992) ("To establish liability in negligence, 
it is a fundamental principle of tort law that there must be a legal duty owed to the 
person injured .... "). 
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confusion and debate.3 Nonetheless, in the last few decades American 
Courts have formed a significant consensus on basic meanings of duty 
as used in common law negligence cases.4 Given the rapid rise in the 
last few decades of the negligence standard and its paradigm of 
reasonable behavior,5 duty has been pressed into service as never before 
and has become the focal point of novel, abstract as well as general 
questions regarding liability-a focal point that.was far less necessary in 
an era dominated by no-liability rules.6 The current leading hornbook 
on Torts, Prosser and Keeton On Torts, asserts that "there is little 
analysis of the problem of duty in the courts[.]"7 This assertion is no 
longer true. 8 Moreover, the Restatement (Second) of Torts' featherlight 
treatment of duty as an abstract or general concept has been superseded 
and eclipsed by modem decisional law.9 These two leading authorities 
do not capture adequately the recent rapid evolution of duty in American 
decisional law. Current law review articles which discuss duty issues 
typically focus upon particular problems of duty such as affirmative 
duty, 10 duties owed by universities to their students, 11 premises liabili-
3. The term duty means several things simultaneously, see infra notes 112-23 and 
accompanying text, and has been subject to problems of equivocation in the courts. As 
the leading authority, Prosser, has pointed out since his first edition, "There is little 
analysis of the problem of duty in the courts. Frequently, it is dealt with in terms of 
what is called 'proximate cause,' usually with resulting confusion." WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 180 (1st ed. 1941) [hereinafter PROSSER 
ON TORTS (1st ed.)]. 
4. Duty can have many sources including statutory sources, but in this Article I 
focus upon common law duty issues. 
5. See Schwartz, supra note 1. 
6. See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A 
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981). 
7. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 358 
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.)]. This assertion appears in the 
first to fourth editions of Prosser as well. See PROSSER (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 180; 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter 
PROSSER ON TORTS (2d ed.)]; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
(3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTS (3rd ed.)]; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTS (4th 
ed.)]. 
8. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) 
(en bane) (engaging in extensive analysis of the nature and source of duty to reach the 
landmark determination that a psychotherapist owes a duty to protect others from a 
patient's expressed violent intention). 
9. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
10. See, e.g., John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: 
Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid 
or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867 (1991); James P. Murphy, Evolution of the 
Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 147 (1980). 
11. See, e.g., Robert D. Bickel & Peter F. Lake, Reconceptualizing the University's 
Duty to Provide a Safe Leaming Environment: A Criticism of the Doctrine of In Loco 
Parentis and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 20 J.C. & U.L. 261 (1994); Brian A. 
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ty, 12 or the standard of conduct, 13 but do not focus as such upon the 
important developments in questions of duty, generally or in the 
abstract. 14 Duty, as a general or abstract topic, has been a neglected 
topic in the secondary literature, although American courts have been 
very active in recent times. 
In this Article, I focus upon the recent explosion of general and 
abstract analysis of duty in modern American courts. Although the 
evolution of "duty" is still in progress, it is now fair to say that an 
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions treat questions of duty 
in negligence law substantially in terms which I will refer to as the 
Prosser (Green) approach.15 The Prosser (Green) approach often 
appears in American decision law via the policy-based, multi-factor 
balancing tests made popular largely through several critical California 
Supreme Court decisions, particularly Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California, 16 Rowland v. Christian, 17 Dillon v. Legg, 18 
and Biakanja v. lrving. 19 American courts have had little use for· the 
relevant sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts when dealing with 
general or abstract questions of duty; American courts basically prefer 
Prosser's professed approach (since the first edition of his treatise which 
itself relies heavily on positions taken by Green20), although one would 
not necessarily detect this from the 1984 edition of the Prosser treatise 
Snow & William E. Thro, Redefining the Contours of University Liability: The Potential 
Implications of Nero v. Kansas State University, 90 EDUC. L. REP. 989 (1994). 
12. See, e.g., Carl S. Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status 
Categories: Allocation of Judge and Jury Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 15 (1981). 
13. See, Schwartz, supra note 1 (pointing to the consolidation of the paradigm of 
reasonableness). 
14. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 10, at 165-67 and n.126. 
15. See infra text following note 129. 
16. See 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (en bane). In a previous Article, I argued that 
Tarasojf is the most significant ambassador of what I refer to here as a variation of the 
Prosser (Green) approach. See Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 
98 (1994) (regarding psychotherapists' duty to warn). 
17. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (regarding landowners). 
18. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress). 
19. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958). 
20. See, e.g., PROSSER (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 180 & n.69, 181 & n.76. White 
correctly observes that Prosser drew heavily upon "the insights of Realism" and that 
"Prosser's philosophical conception of Torts was derivative of those of early twentieth-
century reformist scholars, especially Green." G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN 
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 157 (1980). White also points out that pre-
treatise Prosser originally criticized Green, but came full circle to agreement with him. 
Id. at 157, 270 n.52. 
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itself.21 This consolidation of a majority position on duty has occurred, 
largely speaking, in the last few decades, and reflects a major, if 
surprisingly conservative,22 jurisprudential development in the field of 
tort law. 
In Section I, I provide a brief history of duty as generally conceived 
in negligence law, leading up to and including important post World 
War II developments (and including a discussion of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts approach). In Section II, I discuss various meanings 
of the term duty and important clarifications thereof in American 
decisional law which have occurred largely in the last few decades. In 
Section III and the Appendix, I present in a fifty-state analysis the 
approaches of modern American courts to general and/or abstract 
questions of duty. In Section IV, I conclude with some jurisprudential 
observations on the evolution of American decisional law. I call upon 
the American Law Institute to revise the topic of duty in negligence law 
and American courts to become conscious of the consensus they have 
formed. 
I. DUTY: A BRIEF HISTORY 
A. Murky and Not So Distant Beginnings 
It is commonly accepted that negligence-as a distinct mode of 
proceeding to gain redress for accidentally caused harms-and its 
fundamental aspect, duty, are relative newcomers to the common law 
scene,23 even though terms like "negligence" and notions of duty did 
appear early in the common law.24 Rowe and Silver point out: 
As the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, the word negligence 
assumed legal significance and began to forge an action destined to replace 
trespass on the case. But the word made its debut without overt connection to 
anything called "duty." Toward the mid-nineteenth century, the word "duty" 
sounded its first cries. 25 
21. The current edition sticks to Prosser' s assertion in his first edition that courts 
provide "little analysis." PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 7, at 358. 
22. One might expect a correlation between the expansion of analysis and use of 
policy factors with a liberal expansion of tort doctrine. Yet, the evidence from recent 
cases suggests that expanded analysis and policy considerations have been used to curtail 
the growth of liability. 
23. See, Jean E. Rowe & Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of Action and 
Inaction in the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasance from 
the Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 807, 828 & n.91, 832 
(1995). 
24. See id. at 828 & n.91. As Prosser asserted "In the early English law, there was 
virtually no consideration of duty." PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 178. 
25. Rowe & Silver, supra note 23, at 832-36. 
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Negligence and duty, as we might recognize them., emerged and 
congealed from. a conceptually different system. of liability for acciden-
tally caused harms based on the old forms of action, primarily, trespass 
and trespass on the case. 26 These protozoan m.om.ents of negligence 
and duty are typically associated with the mid-to-late-nineteenth 
century.27 
B. Duty as a Prerequisite To Liability: No-Duty and a 
No-Liability System 
Although it is tempting to hail landmark nineteenth century decisions 
like Brown v. Kendall28 as the birthplace of modem fault-based 
negligence liability, Rabin has observed that the nineteenth century 
featured a strong no-liability paradigm., one in which no-duty (and, thus, 
no-liability) rules factored prominently. Prosser recognized a relation-
ship between the rise of a duty analysis and no ( or limited) liability 
results: "The period during which [duty] developed was that of the 
industrial revolution, and there is good reason to believe that it was a 
means by which the courts sought, perhaps more or less unconsciously, 
to limit the responsibilities of growing industry within some reasonable 
bounds."29 Whether duty operated as a way to protect fledgling 
industry, 30 or merely occurred in the context of a generally limited 
liability system.,31 two propositions about duty in negligence law 
became unmistakably clear by the late nineteenth century. 
26. Id. at 832. 
27. Id. at 832-36. 
28. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); see Rabin, supra note 6. 
29. PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 179; see Percy H. Winfield, Duty 
in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 41 (1934). 
30. Prosser' s suggestion has become more than just history; it is the ratio decendi 
of some caselaw. The concept of duty during the late nineteenth century was a "legal 
device ... designed to curtail the feared propensities of juries towards liberal awards." 
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968); see also, JOHN G. FLEMING, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 47 (1967). 
31. See Rabin, supra note 6. 
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First, cases like Winterbottom v. Wright 32 established that the 
existence of a duty owed to a given party was a prerequisite to 
establishing actionable negligence. In Winterbottom, a postman sued the 
party responsible in contract for keeping the Postmaster's coaches in 
good repair when the coach he was. operating failed (allegedly from 
neglect of repair) and caused him terrible injury.33 The injured 
coachman, however, lacked privity of contract with the defendant, and, 
hence, no duty was owed by the defendant to the injured coachman:34 
No duty, no liability. 
Second, no-liability results and no-duty conclusions were often used 
interchangeably. No duty rules factored heavily into a system of no-
liability, and it became easy to confuse the proposition that there is no 
liability in negligence without duty with the proposition that if there is 
no actionable negligence, then there is no duty. Thus, Winterbottom 
largely became a kind of no-duty or irnrnunity-by-privity rule,35 
whereby those without privity of contract could avoid actionable 
negligence. And, as Prosser pointed out, courts would often confuse 
issues of causation (and, sometimes, no-liability rules) and duty with 
little helpful analysis.36 Therefore, the problems of duty and liability 
became confusingly intertwined and much of what is considered essential 
analytical clarity in modem negligence law would have been mostly 
unnecessary in that era. 
While today there has been a general trend away from no duty 
rules,37 by no means has modem caselaw completely eradicated the 
problem of lack of clarity, although, it has clearly diminished in the last 
thirty years in that courts recognize that no-liability results arise from the 
32. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. FL. 1842); see also, Degg v. Midland Ry. Co., 156 
Eng. Rep. 1413, 1416-17 (Exch. 1857). In modem terms, it is understood that duty is 
an essential element of a prima facie case of negligence. See PROSSER ON TORTS (1st 
ed.), supra note 3, at 175, 177. 
33. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 402-03
34. Id. at 406-09. 
35. Cases like Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 396 (1852), involving mislabeled 
poisons, etc., defied the Winterbottom privity rule and later became precedent for 
Cardozo's landmark decision in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 
Ct. App. 1916), which signaled the demise of the Winterbottom rule. 
36. Frequently [duty] is dealt with in terms of what is called 'proximate 
cause,' usually with resulting confusion. In such cases, the question of what 
is 'proximate' and that of duty are fundamentally· the same: whether the 
interests of the plaintiff are to be protected against the particular invasion by 
the defendant's conduct. 
PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 180. 
37. See Schwartz, supra note 1; Joseph W. Little, Erosion of No-Duty Negligence 
Rules in England, The United States, and Common Law Commonwealth Nations, 20 
Rous. L. REv. 959 (1983). 
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distinct issues of causation, breach, affirmative defenses and immuni-
ty. 38 Consider, for example, the infamous "no duty to rescue" case, 
Yania v. Big an, 39 or how some courts have accepted the proposition 
that universities owe "no duty" to protect their students from certain 
violent situations.40 
In Yania v. Bigan, a business invitor enticed an invitee to jump into 
a ditch filled with water, and the invitee, who voluntarily jumped, 
drowned.41 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled, inter alia, that 
"[t]he mere fact that Bigan [the invitor] saw Yania [the invitee] in a 
position of peril in the water imposed upon him no legal, although a 
moral, obligation or duty to go to his rescue unless Bigan was legally 
responsible, in whole or in part, for placing Yania in the perilous 
position."42 Whereas Yania is often associated with no-duty-to-rescue 
rules,43 Yania, like so many common law cases before it, confuses and 
conflates duty with liability and no duty with no-liability. Yania, in 
modern terms, could be explained as a causation case (invitee who in 
full mental capacity chooses to jump is sole proximate cause of injury 
or even sole cause in fact), an assumption-of-risk case ( one who tries an 
experiment bears its consequences44), and/or as a no-breach-of-duty 
case (given the geometry of the ditch as described in the opinion, one 
must wonder whether someone would be crazy to risk jumping after a 
38. The notion that duty means liability has reemerged in some contexts with 
telling rhetorical effect. In Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), the 
court ruled that no duty was owed by a university to its students arising from alcohol 
related, injury-causing conduct of other students. In reasoning to its no-duty conclusion 
(a conclusion a number of courts have also reached, following Bradshaw, see Bickel & 
Lake, supra note 11), the court put particular emphasis on the idea that.to impose a duty 
would make a university an "insurer" of student safety. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138. 
However, the mere recognition of a duty owed does not necessarily mean that liability 
will follow; a plaintiff must show breach of that duty, causing compensable damage, and 
avoid affirmative defenses. 
39. 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959). 
40. See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979); Beach v. University 
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552 
(Ill. Ct. App. 1987). But see Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993); 
Furek v. University of Del., 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991). 
41. See Yania, 155 A.2d at 344. 
42. Id. at 346. 
43. See, e.g., Vermont v. Joyce, 433 A.2d 271, 273 (Vt. 1981); Miller v. Amal 
Corp., 632 P.2d 987, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981). 
44. Herr v. Booten, 580.A.2d 1115 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1990) (a subsequent and recent 
case from the Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court viewing Yania in light of 
assumption of risk analysis). 
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drowning coal miner in such a ditch). Yania intermingles "no duty" in 
a no-liability sense with other prima facie and affirmative defense 
concepts. 
Alternatively, consider in recent times that certain cases like Beach v.
University of Utah45 have held that no duty is owed to protect students 
from certain violent situations, because a university is not a "babysitter" 
or insurer of the safety of its students.46 These cases seek to absolve 
the university of liability and to do so choose a no-duty rationale which 
has the advantage of ending a case as a matter of law, usually early on 
in the proceedings. However, other courts47 and commentators48 
question a no-duty rationale, when the true issues may be breach of duty, 
causation, and affirmative defenses. 
C. Cardozo on Duty 
It might have been almost anyone,49 but commentators and history 
helped to make Justice Cardozo critical to the evolution of duty in 
American decisional law.5° Cardozo's role was critical, but he did not 
clarify all of the problems of duty. Instead Cardozo's opinions on duty 
set the stage for many pre-modem open questions of duty. Cardozo 
became an intermediate figure in the history of duty; his central 
importance has been to cement the question of duty to issues of 
foreseeability. 51 
Two recent commentators assert that "[i]n America, the notion of duty 
as relevant to negligence matured largely through a line of opinions 
penned by Justice Cardozo."52 Judge-Posner, a great expositor on tort 
issues, devoted a book to the topic of Cardozo.53 Posner refers 
45. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). 
46. See Snow & Thro, supra note 11, at 993. 
47. Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768 (Kan. 1993); Furek v. University of 
Del., 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991); Johnson v. State, 894 P.2d 1366 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
48. Bickel & Lake, supra note 11; Snow & Thro, supra note 11. 
49. But it was not. Judge Posner has emphasized that Cardozo had the ability to 
elevate an ordinary case to greater levels of significance. RICHARD A. POSNER, 
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 45-47 (1990). 
50. WHITE, supra note 20, at 114-38. 
51. As White observes: 
[l]nquiries were made by the judge about whether a given defendant owed a 
duty to protect a given plaintiff from the risk of the particular injury that had 
occurred. In Cardozo' s analysis judge-controlled standards such as 'reasonable 
foreseeability' and 'ambit of risk' replaced ambiguous standards such as 
'proximity' of causation. 
Id. at 125. 
52. Rowe & Silver, supra note 23, at 836. 
53. POSNER, supra note 49. Posner has showed great interest in Cardozo in other 
writings as well. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE (1988). 
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prominently to Cardozo's most famous tort duty cases.54 Posner links 
these cases to Cardozo' s powerful reputation as a judge and to the 
attainment of what he refers to as "omnisignificance."55 According to 
Posner, these cases were Cardozo's "most famous line of opinions."56 
Paradoxically, Posner also asserts that these cases are inconsistent.57 
Omnisignificance (the something for everyone flavor) according to 
Posner arises, inter alia, from the broad generality of the rationales of 
the decisions and from the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the 
opinions: "Cardozo wrote opinions that can be invoked by judges and 
scholars who want to broaden the scope of liability, and also opinions 
that can be invoked by judges and scholars who want to limit or reduce 
that scope."58 Thus, in Palsgraf, Cardozo limited duty to foreseeable 
plaintiffs in the scope of duty. 59 And in Moch, echoing concerns of 
extended liability, 60 he limited. the zone of duty to those parties to 
whom a duty was assumed and/or to those who had begun performance 
such that "[i]f conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction 
would commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, 
but positively or actively involving an injury, there exists a relation out 
of which arises a duty to go forward."61 Yet in MacPherson, Cardozo 
crushed the privity rule of Winterbottom, opening the door to modern 
negligence-based product liability actions.62 Glanzer, also, suggests the 
expansion of liability. 63 
Cardozo's efforts at analyzing duty at a general, even abstract, level 
caught the attention of Prosser, the leading doctrinal academic expositor 
· 54. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1931); H.R. Moch 
Co. v. Rennselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928); Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1922); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
1916). . 
55. Peter F. Lake, Posner's Pragmatist Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REV. 545, 606-
08 (1994). 
56. POSNER, supra note 49, at 107. 
57. POSNER, supra note 49, at 113; see Lake, supra note 55, at 607-08. 
58. POSNER, supra note 49, at 113. 
59. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99-101. 
60. POSNER, supra note 49, at 109-13 (see discussion of Cardozo's opinion in 
Ultramares). 
61. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rennselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928). 
. 62. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1054-55 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
1916). According to Posner, "MacPherson is Cardozo's most important opinion in terms 
of impact on the law." POSNER, supra note 49, at 109. 
63. POSNER, supra note 49, at 109-13. 
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of tort and negligence law in the twentieth century. Prosser's classic 
articles on Cardozo's most celebrated opinions Palsgraf and 
MacPherson, (Palsgraf Revisited 64 and The Assault Upon the Citadel 
& The Fall of the Citadel65 ), did much, along with Prosser's prominent 
use of Cardozo's cases in his casebooks66 and treatises,67 to focus 
attention on Cardozo's views of duty, foreseeability and proximate 
causation. 
Cardozo's scope of duty decisions and Prosser's secondary literature 
on them formed much of the received wisdom about duty in negligence 
law in the period leading up to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and, 
to a large extent, even after. Several duty points were either reaffirmed 
and/or established. First, the existence of duty was a prerequisite to 
negligence liability, · and the foremost question to be answered as a 
matter of law by the court. 68 Second, duty was critical in the assess-
ment of the scope of liability: duty determinations would either expand 
or contract the scope of liability. 69 Third, duty came to be viewed as 
relative, relational, mutable and subject to a variety of factors, particular-
ly foreseeability,70 some directly adverted to by decisional law, others 
not. 11 
64. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1953). 
65. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the 
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel 
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). 
66. See WILLIAM PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 
1982); see also DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY(2d ed. 1993). 
67. See supra notes 3 & 7 and accompanying text. 
68. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928). 
69. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rennselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
1928) ("We are satisfied that liability would be unduly and indeed indefinitely extended 
by this enlargement of the zone of duty."). 
70. Cardozo's repeated emphasis on foreseeability may have influenced some 
courts to put prominent, even nearly exclusive, emphasis on foreseeability. See, e.g., 
Hansen v. Friend, 824 P.2d 483,487 (Wash. 1992). Many courts consider foreseeability 
to be a prominent concern. See, e.g., McCain v. Florida Power, 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 
1992); Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Ala. 1986); Tarasoff 
v, Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976). Recently, many courts 
have affirmed that the prominence of foreseeability in considering a duty question does 
not mean that other considerations are always outweighed. See, e.g., Hawks v. State 
Dept. of Public Safety, 908 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1995); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 
N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977). 
71. Duty is a relative concept. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101. Prosser explained that 
as ideas of relations change, duties change with them. Prosser, supra note 64, at 13. 
Prosser, commenting on Palsgraf and duty generally, pointed to the balancing of factors 
in the analysis of duty: "In the decision whether or not there is a duty, many factors 
interplay: the hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of 
administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss should fall." Id. at 
15. 
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Cardozo, and Prosser's commenting on Cardozo, made duty issues 
central to the development of modem tort law. Paradoxically, Cardozo 
left open many questions of duty and, thus, emphasized the open-
endedness of duty analysis. This set the predicate for the development 
of the analysis of duty that has occurred in modem American decisional 
law. 
D. The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) 
At the time of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, American courts had 
not widely accepted the general or abstract methodology for the analysis 
of duty that courts commonly accept today,72 although Cardozo's views 
on the zone or orbit of duty had captured the attention of many courts 
and the Restatement of Torts, which accepted Palsgra/3 (again, aided 
by Prosser's commentary).74 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
reflects the fact of its formation during an intermediate pre-modem phase 
in the analysis of general or abstract matters of duty. 
Recognizing the importance of the term duty to tort law generally, and 
to negligence law particularly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts set 
forth the denotation of "duty" in Chapter 1, Section 4 of that Restate-
ment.75 Noting that the most common use of the term duty was in 
negligence law analysis, that Restatement stated the meaning of duty: 
§ 4. Duty 
The word "duty" is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote 
the fact that the actor is required to conduct himself in a particular manner at 
the risk that if he does not do so he becomes subject to liability to another to 
whom the duty is owed for any injury sustained by such other, of which that 
actor's conduct is a legal cause.76 
"Duty" as used in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, features at least 
three key points: duty as it relates to negligence law, duty as it relates 
to a standard of conduct, and duty as it relates to interests that are 
legally protected. First, duty is primarily used in conjunction with the 
72. See Appendix, infra. 
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b) cmt. c, illus. 3 (1965). 
74. The Restatement of Torts continues to use Cardozo's zone of duty notions. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1977) (note that "Illustration 
1" is Palsgraf). 
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. b. 
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 4 cmts. 
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law of negligence, and less frequently used in other, non-negligence 
based tort contexts.77 Second, duty is "useful to describe the require-
ment that the actor, if he acts at all, must exercise reasonable care to 
make his acts safe for others."78 Thus, duty is useful in describing the 
governing standard of conduct: reasonable care. And, according to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the term duty denotes what reasonable 
care in a particular circumstance means as well.79 One is said to have 
a duty of reasonable care and, for example, to have a duty to stop at a 
stop sign before proceeding. Duty means a general standard of care as 
well as what is ·determined to be reasonable· in a particular set of 
circumstances (the specification of the general standard of care). Third, 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes legally protected interests 
critical to the assessment of tort responsibility80 and links legal 
protection to duty. "If society recognizes a desire as so far legitimate as 
to make one who interferes with its violation civilly liable, the interest 
is given legal protection, generally against all the world, so that everyone 
is under a duty not to invade the interest .... "81 
Duty, therefore, in the Restatement (Second) of Torts has a derivative 
function. Duty is a way of speaking of or about other, more immediate 
concerns, such as the definition of negligence, 82 the determination of 
the applicable standard of care in particular contexts, 83 and legally 
protected interests, which give rise to negligence liability. 84 Thus, in the 
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cm.t. b (emphasis added). 
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 cmt. b. 
79. '"Duty,' as the word is used in all the [s]ubjects of the Restatement, is a duty 
to conduct one's self in a particular manner." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4· 
cmt. c (1965). This was a position which Prosser endorsed. See PROSSER ON TORTS (3d 
ed.), supra note 7, at 331. Over time, Prosser moved away somewhat from this 
definition of duty, recognizing that it resulted in the use of the term duty as a substitute 
for standard or standard of care as determined in a particular context. PROSSER ON 
TORTS (4th ed.), supra note 7, at 324. Although still defining duty in his traditional 
way, Prosser stated: 
Id. 
It is quite possible, and not at all uncommon, to deal with most of the 
questions which arise in a negligence case in terms of "duty." Thus, the 
standard of conduct required of the individual may be expressed by saying that 
the driver of an automobile approaching an intersection is under a duty to 
moderate his speed .... But the problems of "duty" are sufficiently complex 
when subdividing it in this manner .... 
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 1, 281. 
81. Id. § cmt. d. 
82. See id. § 282 cmt a. 
83. See, e.g., id. §§ 282, 284, 285 cmts. e, h; PROSSER ON TORTS (4th ed.), supra 
note 7, at 324. . 
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 1, 281. 
1514 
[VOL. 34: 1503, 1997] Negligence Law 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, duty dissolves into the .larger analysis of 
negligence law, only crystalizing here and there. 85 
Thus, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts' approach to negli-
gence, unlike for Prosser86 and Cardozo, duty is not an element of the 
cause of action for negligence.87 Moreover, the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts delves deeply into the analysis and types of negligence and the 
determination and particularization of the governing standard of care, 88 
but does not devote any section to the analysis of duty as such. 89 Duty 
is integrated into the identity of other primary concepts.90 If one were 
to pick up the Restatement (Second) of Torts as a visitor from another 
legal system, duty would appear to be almost irrelevant and fading away. 
Yet modem caselaw analyzes general or abstract questions of duty in 
great detail and provides a framework of analysis that cannot be located 
easily, if at all, in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.91 As history 
would have it, the analysis of duty in American decisional law took an 
important leap forward, following certain critical developments occurring 
shortly after the promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
E. Biakanja, Dillon, Rowland and Tarasoff: The 
Power of Prosser (Green) 
The effects of the decisions of the California Supreme Court during 
the period of the 1960's - 1970's cannot be (and have not been) 
85. See, e.g.,. id. § 281 cmt. e. "In other words the duty established by law to 
refrain from the negligent conduct is established in order to protect the other from the 
risk of having his interest invaded harm .... " Id. 
86. See PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.),.supra note 3, § 30, at 175; PROSSER ON 
TORTS (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 35, at 165; PROSSER ON TORTS (3d ed.), supra note 7, 
§ 30, at 146; PROSSER ON TORTS (4th ed.), supra note 7, § 30, at 148; PROSSER ON 
TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 7, § 30, at 164. 
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 281. 
88. See id. §§ 282-309. 
89. Unless one treats the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 4, as such an instance. 
90. Modem first year students of torts are often baffled by the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts because of this. A prima facie case of negligence consists of the 
demonstration by plaintiff of duty, breach, causation and damage. See PROSSER ON 
TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, § 30; PROSSER ON TORTS (2d ed.), supra note 7, § 35; 
PROSSER ON TORTS(3d ed.), supra note 7, § 30. Yet the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
went with a different·conceptual scheme. See supra note 87, § 281. 
91. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text. 
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underestimated.92 Cases like Dillon v. Legg,93· 94 Rowland v. Chris-
tian,95 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,96 Biakanja v. 
Irving,97 and Tarasoff v. Board of Regents,98 have altered the land-
scape of American tort law by either becoming the majority rule, the 
basis of the majority rule, the modem trend, or the baseline from which 
we judge the development of the law, including tort reform. 99 These 
cases did a great deal to expand the reach of tort law, particularly 
92. See, e.g., John L. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward A Unified 
Theory of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS 
L.J. 477 (1984); David A. Fischer, Tort Law: Expanding the Scope of Recovery 
Without Loss of Jury Control, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937 (1983); Shlomo Twerski, Note, 
Affirmative Duty After Tarasojf, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1013 (1983). I focus here on 
some of the more obvious major influences. There are·many others. See, e.g., Brown 
v. Merlo, 506 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1973) (California Supreme Court makes California the first 
state to reject an automobile guest statute as unconstitutional). 
93. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (expanding the class of individuals who might state 
a viable cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, even beyond that 
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts). . . 
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 306, 312-13, 436A (1965). 
95. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (abolishing traditional landowner entrant status 
classification in favor of a general duty of reasonable care). 
96. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (establishing strict liability in tort for dangerously 
defective products). · · 
97. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) (extending tort liability with regard to non privy 
parties). 
98. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (requiring psychotherapists to warn foreseeable 
victims of their patients' expressed violent intentions). 
99. Simply stated, the basic ideas of Greenman and Tarasoff are clear majority 
favorites. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A; Peter F. Lake, Virginia 
is Not Safe for "Lovers": The Virginia Supreme Court Rejects Tarasoff in Nasser v. 
Parker, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1285 (1995). Dillon's impact on the law of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress has been complex, but pervasive. And Rowland, which 
has not captured a majority of states as such, has factored prominently in American 
decisional law not willing to accept it. See JOSEPH PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES 
LIABILITY § 6.4 (1976); see also, Carl S. Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation 
of the Status Categories: Allocation of Judge and Jury Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 
15 (1981) (arguing that many cases emphasizing the Rowland rule would have been 
resolved the same way under traditional landowner entrant status category analysis). 
Moreover, Rowland-type rules are effective in whole or in part in California, New York, 
Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, among others, making them disproportionately important 
in terms of population. See Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 54-59 (Neb. 
1996). Rowland is not a majority rule as such, although roughly half of all Americans 
live under some form of Rowland rules. The following states have abolished outright 
entrant status classifications: California, Hawaii, Colorado, New York, New Hampshire, 
Louisiana, Alaska, Illinois, Montana, and Nevada, (Rhode Island presents a special 
problem). See id. Many other states have abolished status categories in part (often 
abolishing distinctions between inviters and licensers). Id. Adding the population of 
these states (Florida, for example) to the population of Rowland states demonstrates that 
a majority of Americans live under Rowland-inspired rules. See MICHAEL KANTOR, U.S. 
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995: THE 
NATIONAL DATA BOOK (regarding calculations of population). 
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negligence law and its paradigm of reasonableness, 100 and may have 
created their own backlash in the more conservative and tort-reform 
oriented moments of the 1980's and 1990's.101 These cases have an 
unmistakable liability expanding potential and are often evaluated from 
that frame of reference.102 New standards of care (or new 
particularizations of the general reasonable standard of care) were 
introduced; new duties in that sense. 
As set forth in the Appendix, Dillon, Rowland, Biakanja and 
particularly Tarasoff 03 have become famous and widely cited for 
several foundational points with respect to duty. The analysis of 
questions of duty generally espoused by these cases has become in one 
form or another, the single most dominant approach in American 
decisional law, and is an analysis that drew heavily from Cardozo and 
Prosser (Green). · 
. Dillon, Rowland, Biakanja and Tarasoff are now commonly relied 
upon in support of one or some combination of the following proposi-
tions:104 
analysis of negligence liability begins with the question of duty105 
duty is not sacrosanct; it is a changeable concept106 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) a statement that a duty is owed is a conclusion that given these 
circumstances and conditions liability should (or should not attach)107 
100. See Schwartz, supra note 1. 
101. See id. . 
102. See, e.g., Donaca v. Curry County, 734 P.2d 1339 (Or . .1987). 
103. See Lake, supra note 16, at 114-15 & n.93. 
104. See id. at 115 & n.93, 119. 
105. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334,342 (Cal. 1976); Dillon 
v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 1968); Biankanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 17 (Cal. 
1958). See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also 
PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, § 30(a), at 175. 
106. Since the first edition of Prosser on Torts in 1941, Prosser has maintained 
"that 'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled 
to protection." PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 180. "These are shifting 
sands, and not fit foundation. There is a duty if the court says there is a duty .... " 
Prosser, supra note 64, at 15. See Tarasojf, 551 P.2d at 342; Dillon, 441 P.2d at 916. 
107. "[Duty] is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis 
itself." PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 180; PROSSER ON TORTS (2d ed.), 
supra note 7, at 167; PROSSER ON TORTS (3d ed.), supra note 7, at 332; PROSSER ON 
TORTS (4th ed.), supra note 7, at 325; PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 7, at 
358. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 916; Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 
28 COL. L. REV. 1014, 1021 (1928) ("[W]hen we say in a particular case that ... 




the determination of duty is based upon consideration of a number of 
factors (often, but not necessarily, called "policy" factors)108 
such "major considerations" include (1) foreseeability; (2) degree of 
certainty that plaintiff's injury occurred; (3) closeness of conduct and 
injury; (4) moral blame; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6) 
burden and consequences of imposing a duty on defendant and 
community; (7) insurance cost, availability and prevalence. 109 
108. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342; Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 
1968); PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 180; PROSSER ON TORTS (2d ed.), 
supra note 7, at 167; PROSSER ON TORTS (3d ed.), supra note 7, at 323-33; PROSSER ON 
TORTS (4th ed.), supra note 7, at 325-26; Prosser, supra note 64, at 15 & n.15 (citing 
Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COL. L. REV. 1014; Leon 
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COL. REV. 255 (1929)); Lake, 
supra note 16; Green, supra note 107, at 1034. 
109. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342; Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19; Rowland, 443 P.2d 
at 564. See also Lake, supra note 16, at 119 & nn.115-16, 118. As is indicated in the
Appendix, many U.S. courts have adopted this particular list of considerations more or 
less as such. Actually, it would be surprising if U.S. courts were to universally set upon 
a single, standard set of policy considerations. 
Professor Murphy has argued that the list of considerations "may be traced, by one 
route or another, to two influential articles in tort law," written by Leon Green. James 
P. Murphy, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 147, 
166 n.126 (1980). "Green originated the enumeration and consideration of policy factors 
which have come to be considered a legitimate step in the resolution of the duty 
question." Id. Green himself recognized that any list of factors would be subject to 
dispute: "I realize that to name these factors is to encourage disputes as to the proper 
terminology .... There is neither hope nor need for a standardized terminology which 
will suffice for longer than the hour." Green, supra note 107, at 1034. Even in 
enumerating the following factors "of most significance in influencing the determination 
of duties," Green stated unequivocally, "[t]here are doubtless others .... " Id. Green's 
factors, not the Tarasojf, Biakanja, Rowland lists as such, were: 
1. the administrative factor; 
2. the ethical or moral factor; 
3. the economic factor; 
4. the prophylactic factor; 
5. the justice factor. 
Id. 
Prosser likewise has consistently taken the position that there is no universal test for 
duty. PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 180; PROSSER ON TORTS (2d ed.), 
supra note 7, at 167; PROSSER ON TORTS (3d ed.), supra note 7, at 332; PROSSER ON 
TORTS (4th ed.), supra note 7, at 335; PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 7, at 
358. Yet, beginning with the first edition, Prosser, following Green explicitly, has 
argued that "[v]arious factors undoubtedly have been given ... weight, including 
convenience of administration, capacity of the parties to bear the loss, a policy of 
preventing future injuries, the moral blame attached to the wrongdoer, and many others." 
PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 181 (citing Leon Green, The Duty Problem 
in Negligence Cases, 28 COL. L. REV. 1014 (1928); Leon Green, The Duty Problem in 
Negligence Cases: II, 29 COL. L. REV. 255 (1929)); PROSSER ON TORTS (2d ed.), supra 
note 7, at 168 (citing same); PROSSER ON TORTS (3d ed.), supra note 7, at 334 (citing 
same). In the fourth edition, Prosser reiterated the same language and again cited Green. 
PROSSER ON TORTS (4th ed.), supra note 7, at 326-27 & n.22. But now Prosser cited 
as "particularly good statements as to the factors affecting duty" three opinions of the 
California Courts, including Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 
1963), overrruled in part, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). That opinion was vindicated in 
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Propositions (1) through (4) are predominantly propositions that were 
asserted by Prosser (Green) and hence reflect what I refer to as the 
Prosser (Green) approach to questions of duty. These propositions in 
whole. or in part form the basis of an overwhelming consensus on the 
analysis of duty which has congealed in American courts in the last few 
decades. Although the prominence of the questions of duty itself and 
the foreseeability factor can be traced also to Cardozo, Prosser was 
critical of Cardozo's typical unwillingness to explicitly analyze the 
factors underlying his duty determinations. 110 
These propositions are also typically cited in California and courts 
following California. The approaches espoused by the California 
Supreme Court in Dillon, Rowland, Biakanja and Tarasoff are a type of 
Prosser ((Green) analysis-a specific instantiation of a more general 
approach.. In fact, specific California factors represent the single most 
popular set of policy factors used by American courts. In its explicit 
form, proposition (5), while California based, does not enjoy the 
overwhelming consensus which propositions (1) - (4) enjoy, although it 
is equally easy to trace the roots of proposition (5) to Prosser (Green). 
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (en bane) (including Tobriner, J., author of 
Tarasofj). See Raymond v. Paradise Unified Sch. Dist. of Batte Cty., 31 Cal. Rptr. 847 
(Cal. 1963); Wright v. Arcade Sch. Dist., 40 Cal. Rptr. 812 (Cal. 1964). The fifth 
edition of the Prosser treatise also repeats the same language, again citing Green (and 
now others). See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 7, at 359 & n.23. But the 
fifth edition supports Prosser's perennial assertion with the Tarasoff factors, among 
others, by way of citation to that case and Vu v. Singer, Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. 
Cal. 1981). PROSSER ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 7, at 359 n.24. 
There is an aspect of evolution in the final Tarasoff seven factors, but it is easy to spot 
Green's concerns, Prosser's concerns, Cardozo's (and Andrews's) intense interest in 
foreseeability questions, and even a bit of Hand's approach. See United States v. Carrol 
Towing, Co., 159 F. 2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
Other courts have emphasized other, sometimes overlapping factors. See, e.g., Wright 
v. Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919, 921 (Va. 1987); Winn v. Gihoy, 681 P.2d 776, 784 n.9 (Or. 
1984) (critical of use of insurance as a factor). Even California has adjusted the list of 
factors in cases raising different issues. See, e.g., Raymond, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 852 (using 
additional factors when a public entity is defendant); Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19 (using 
certain factors, some overlapping with the Tarasoff seven, to analyze economic loss 
problems). Courts also acknowledge that appropriate policy factors may be set by the 
legislature. 
110. See Green, supra note 107, at 1021 ("[i]t is a rare thing that an opinion 
acknowledges the forces which must have impelled the judgment pronounced."); Prosser, 
supra note 64. 
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As I note, this is to be expected. 111 Nonetheless, the California 
approach has become the most recognizable Prosser (Green) variation 
and may continue to grow in importance. 
II. VARIOUS MEANINGS OF DUTY IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 
"Duty" as the word has been used by courts in this century has had 
several meanings. It is a curious feature of modem tort law that the 
most fundamental concept has been so fundamentally equivocated.112 
As Prosser pointed out, "It is quite possible, and not at all uncommon, 
to deal with most of the questions which arise in a negligence case in 
.terms of 'duty[:]"'113 "the problem of duty is as broad as the whole 
of the law of negligence."114 In this century, at least four meanings of 
the term "duty" have been frequently used in regard to the law of negli-
gence. 
A. Duty as Liability 
Duty has been used to refer to negligence liability. 115 Thus, one 
might say that one has a duty not to run over a very young child with 
a vehicle, meaning that one has a duty of reasonable care while 
operating a vehicle, which is breached if a young child is hit and 
physically in fact and proximately injured by the vehicle, and is a child 
against whom the defenses of contributory fault and/or assumption of 
risk did not apply. In other words, the term duty is often used to state 
the conclusion of the calculation of various aspects of the prima facie 
case of negligence and. its defenses and the interplay of non-doctrinal 
considerations or policy concerns. This use of the term duty is 
sometimes imprecise and can cause confusion.116 At common law, for 
example, one could easily assert that no duty is owed to a faulty 
plaintiff. Today, we might prefer to say that a faulty plaintiff was 
111. See supra note 109. 
112. At times Prosser could be heard to make assertions such as "[duty] means, of 
course, an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform .to 
some standard of conduct toward another." Prosser, supra note 64, at 12. But Prosser 
was no stranger to the perplexities of the term duty, and to its open endedness. See id. 
at 13. 
113. PROSSER ON TORTS (4th ed.), supra note 7, at 324; PROSSER ON TORTS (5th 
ed.), supra note 7, at 356. 
114. PROSSER ON TORTS (4th ed.), supra note 7, § 53, at 326; PROSSER ON TORTS 
(5th ed.), supra note 7, § 53, at 357-58. 
115. As Prosser has pointed out since the first edition, duty is often a "shorthand 
statement of a conclusion" about liability. PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, 
at 180; see Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976). 
116. See Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959). 
1520 
[VOL. 34: 1503, 1997] Negligence Law 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
unable to assert an actionable claim of negligence at common law. 
From the first edition of Prosser's text, he noted this type of problem in 
a more prominent permutation: duty v. proximate causation. 117 In this 
sense, duty, as Prosser pointed out, is everywhere in negligence law, yet 
defies a universal list. 
B. Duty as Standard of Care, General or Particular 
A more precise way to conceive of duty has been in terms of a general 
standard of conduct.· In this sense, "the duty is always the same, to 
conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in light of the 
apparent risk."118 In this sense, the term duty and the phrase "general 
standard of conduct (care)" become synonymous. Duty is also 
sometimes used to refer to the particularization of a more general 
standard of care.119 Thus, it is possible to subdivide the matter of duty 
"to cover an endless series of details of conduct."120 
C. Duty as Negligent Conduct: Standard of Conduct and Breach 
Another way (perhaps two) to conceive of the term duty is as an 
expression of negligent conduct, meaning duty (in modem terms of a 
standard of care) and breach thereof. Thus, a driver speeding through 
a school zone is engaging in negligent conduct: the driver has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care, and it is unreasonable to speed in.a school zone 
(breach of duty). That is negligent conduct, 121 but not necessarily 
actionable negligence, which would require proof of, among other 
elements, causation. Duty used in this sense combines at least three 
aspects: general standard of care, particularization thereof (if necessary) 
117. PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 180. 
118. PROSSER ON TORTS (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 166; PROSSER ON TORTS (3d 
ed.), supra note 7, at 146; PROSSER ON TORTS (4th ed.), supra note 7, at 324; PROSSER 
ON TORTS (5th ed.), supra note 7, at 356. One might build into that sense of "duty," as 
Prosser did, the idea that duty is "a question of whether the defendant is under any 
obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff .... " PROSSER ON TORTS (2d ed.), 
supra note 7, at 166. 
119. See PROSSER ON TORTS (2d ed.), supra note 7, at 166. 
120. Id. 
121. Prosser pointed out that some courts call this "negligence," see PROSSER ON 
TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 177, and also described this as "negligent conduct." 
Id. at 178. 
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and breach of duty in the general and particular sense (the failure to use 
the appropriate amount of care). 
D. Duty as First Element of Prima F acie Case 
Increasingly, today's courts, where appropriate, distinguish duty from 
negligent conduct (although, again, the term duty is still used to refer to 
the latter). Doctrinally, duty is most often identified as the first element 
of a prima facie case of negligence and is distinguished from the second 
element, breach. 122 When the term duty is used in this sense ( often 
combined with the "standard of care" sense of the term duty) it is used 
in a very precise, modern way. While in this century the term duty has 
been used loosely to refer to most issues of liability in negligence law, 
modern courts use the term in an increasingly more precise way. One 
of the most important developments in the law of negligence in recent 
times has been the increasing clarification of the use of the term duty 
and the recognition that many precedent cases, some from just a 
generation ago, lacked clarity with respect to the basic doctrinal notion 
of duty. Even though courts continue to use the term duty in multiple 
ways, today's courts are more careful to set out the sense in which they 
are using the term in a given instance. 123 Thus, even when courts use 
duty in the first sense, they tend to clarify that that is a slightly different 
sense than this fourth sense. 
III. ANALYSIS OF DUTY IN THE 50 STATES124 
A survey of recent case law in the fifty states reveals that in the last 
few decades (primarily the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's), American 
jurisdictions have overwhelmingly reached and discussed questions of 
122. In the first edition, Prosser stated what is now considered to be axiomatic-that 
a prima facie case of negligence consists of duty, breach, causation (in fact, proximate) 
and damage. See PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 175-78. The 
Restatement of Torts and Restatement (Second) of Torts elected a different formulation. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 281 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 281 
(1934). Modem courts do not track that formulation as such, but typically follow the 
Prosser approach. See PROSSER ON TORTS (1st ed.), supra note 3, at 177 & n.53. This 
feature of the Restatement (Second) could use updating. 
123. Tarasoff is an excellent example of this. Justice Tobriner first speaks of duty 
in terms of a conclusion about the liability, and then formulates duty as a standard of 
care, at first general, then more particular. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
124. My research is presented here largely through recent state Supreme Court 
decisions. Typically, I do not focus on the federal courts primarily applying state law 
under Erie or an Erie "guess" nor upon lower state court decisions, or decisions in the 
District of Columbia. 
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duty in general and even abstract terms and have converged strongly on 
several key points that can be traced specifically to Prosser (Green) and, 
in many cases, to the California cases which have adopted and adapted 
that approach. Other states-now a noticeable minority125 -analyze 
duty questions in ways that are compatible with certain key Prosser 
(Green) notions, without overtly relying on Prosser (Green) or California 
decisions. Principally, American courts overwhelmingly adhere to the 
idea that duty-not sacrosanct, but a conclusion-must be analyzed in 
terms of public policy, social considerations and/or other such factors. 
With regard to general and/or abstract questions of duty, American 
courts overwhelmingly disregard the Restatement (Second) of Torts 126 
and are much more likely to refer to a Restatement section regarding a 
particular standard of conduct (duty in that sense). Only a tiny number 
of states (mostly also small by population) remain in the posture of 
"limboanalysis" first described by Prosser many years ago. 127 No 
major jurisdiction, except perhaps Virginia, has avoided the clear 
movement of American common law tort law. In matters of negligence 
law, American common law courts have formed an important jurispru-
dential consensus, which in orientation is neither inherently liberal 
(defined here merely as increasing potential negligence responsibility) or 
conservative (defined here merely as either maintaining status quo 
negligence responsibility or retreating from status quo negligence 
responsibility). 
Not surprisingly, general and/or abstract discussions of duty occur 
primarily in highly contested cases revolving around "hot" issues of 
liability, such as infliction of emotional distress on bystanders, landown-
er duties, duties to warn about or control the behavior of dangerous 
125. Among these states are jurisdictions like Massachusetts and New York which 
have been analyzing questions of duty in general and/or abstract terms in decisional law 
which significantly predates the period of the expansion of the concept of duty that 
occurred from the 1970's onward. These jurisdictions tend to follow their own drummer 
and have been doing so for some time. Nonetheless, the analysis they use is very 
compatible with what Prosser and Green promoted. See Appendix, infra. 
126. Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts considered the question of 
negligence liability in terms of legally protected interests. See PROSSER ON TORTS (5th 
ed.), supra note 7, § 30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281. Many times, U.S. 
courts make reference to this type of thinking, see Appendix, infra, but they rarely 
expound upon it as such, mainly turning their attention instead to discussion of 
considerations of policy, etc. and they do not adopt the cause of action/elements 
formulation which the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 proposes. 
127. See, e.g., Appendix, infra, South Carolina. 
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individuals, or economic loss. Thus, one might have the impression that 
the question(s) of duty in a general or abstract sense are now a live issue 
in all cases of negligence law. But in a very practical sense most cases 
present no difficult general or abstract questions of duty. As the New 
Jersey Supreme Court (known to some as an activist court 128) ob-
served: 
In most cases the justice of imposing such a duty is so clear that the cause of 
action in negligence is assumed to exist simply on the basis of the actor's 
creation of an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm resulting in injury. In fact, 
however, more is needed, 'more' being the value. judgment, based on an 
analysis of public policy, that the actor owed the injured party a duty of 
reasonable care. 129 
In the Appendix, I address the fifty states in alphabetical order. 
Citations to and quotation from important recent decisions provide 
support for the following conclusions: 
(1) Overwhelmingly, U.S. jurisdictions now clearly and strongly 
support the Prosser (Green) approach to general and/or abstract 
questions of duty-the largest plurality of the states follow the 
California model of that approach; 
(2) Most remaining states follow approaches which are highly 
compatible with the Prosser (Green) approach; 
(3) A very few states have not clearly joined the majority-none 
of these states (and no other state) has rejected the Prosser 
(Green) approach as such; 
(4) Most cases involving an expanded analysis of questions of duty 
generally or in the abstract have occurred iin the last three 
decades; 
(5) Overwhelmingly, American jurisdictions put little emphasis 
upon the Restatement ( Second) of Torts for general or abstract 
questions of common law duty: for example, American courts 
follow the prima facie case ( cause of action) format Prosser 
espoused, not the one contained in Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 281; 
(6) Foreseeability, as Cardozo, Prosser (Green) and the California 
courts agree, has become prominent in questions of duty ( and 
other questions of liability)-however, foreseeability is not the 
only determinant of liability; 
128. Phil Weiser, What's Quality Got to Do With It?: Constitutional Theory, 
Politics and Education Reform, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 745, 773 & n.178 
(1994-1995). 
129. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (N.J. 1984) (citations omitted). 
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(7) American courts now often turn to an expanded analysis of 
duty to reach "conservative results"-those that are liability-
limiting. 
IV SOME JURISPRUDENTIAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DUTY: THE 
TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND THE RETURN OF DUTY 
AS LIABILITY LIMITING TOOL 
I credit the two principal historical accounts relating to the role of 
duty in the nineteenth century-duty as a liability limiting tool 
protecting nascent industry and duty as part of a greater no-liability 
milieu (Rabin's notion)-as recognizing the same basic point: duty 
existed in the context of a general private law consensus that non-
contractual liability should be very limited, except when an invasion of 
tangible property occurred. Nothing like today's system of widespread 
accountability for unreasonable behavior causing personal injury existed 
in the Nineteenth Century.130 Duty, therefore, had little, abstract or 
general work to do because of a widespread, if tacit, agreement upon the 
goals of tort law. However, particularly since World War II, the tort 
system has steadily eroded the no-liability paradigms of an earlier era, 
illustrated by Rabin. 131 Concomitant with that steady erosion has been 
the rise of the explanatory power of the paradigm of reasonable behavior 
and its negligence (duty) focus, as pointed out by Schwartz.132 Duty 
(somewhat erroneously or overbroadly) was associated historically with 
no-liability results; it was natural to look to duty as the tort liability 
system took a broad turn toward expanded liability. Paradoxically, while 
duty was essential at mid-twentieth century, as Prosser correctly asserted 
at that time, it had suffered little analysis in the courts. 
Early in the twentieth century, Leon Green pursued the legal realist 
notion that duty was a function of policy.133 The idea was correct, but 
functionally premature in the sense that at that time, given the tacit 
consensus on a largely no-liability system, the idea was, practically 
speaking, banal. There were few occasions to turn to .the abstract and 
general questions of duty in a system that often held that a personal 
130. See Rabin, supra note 6; Schwartz, supra note 1. 
131. Rabin, supra note 6. 
132. Schwartz, supra note 1. 
133. Green, supra note 107. 
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injury plaintiff without privity lost. At first, even Prosser was critical of 
Green's basic idea. 
Cardozo, who documented the final moments of the no-liability 
regime, fostered the idea that duty and a meta-determinant of liability, 
foreseeability, 134 were essential to the calculation of liability. In this 
. vein, Cardozo fired the ambiguous messages of this threshold period in 
tort history-e.g., McPherson opening the door to product liability, 
Palsgraf limiting liability. In a time when cracks were appearing in a 
no-liability system, the concerns over the potential of hemorrhaging 
liability were strong. Cardozo was the general of another era; the 
continued reference to the Cardozo/ Andrews debate today draws upon 
a historically significant moment in the evolution of duty, but heavy 
reliance now is like the deployment of the Polish Cavalry in September 
1939, in that the arsenals of duty have evolved. 
Post World War II America saw a dramatic shift, doctrinally, towards 
an active system of personal injury liability founded in negligence. If 
Schwartz is right, the rise of liability insurance, the booms in the post-
war economy and the distrust of many beneficiaries of no-liability 
paradigms (corporations, governments, families, landowners, etc.), 
contributed to allaying Cardozian fears with respect to widespread duty. 
Duty became the centerpiece of a much bigger show, but it lacked 
sufficient analytical development in the courts to support the role it was 
being asked to perform. Thus, a paradox of the 1960's and early 1970's 
emerged in that there were duties everywhere, but the leading scholar-
ship gave little attention to general or abstract questions of duty. 
Prosser, it seems, had a sixth sense about the future of duty (made 
easier because he played such a prominent role in bringing about the 
future of duty) and anticipated its development with pithy aphorisms in 
the hornbook editions _and with pre-modern analysis in the famous (and 
134. Cardozo viewed duty as essential to liability and foreseeability as critical in 
determining duty. Foreseeability was a meta-determinant or criterion with respect to 
liability. See Lake, supra note 16. This simple jurisprudential insight, prominent in 
legal realism and H.L.A. Hart's positivist position, that there are determinants of liability 
that are themselves not immediate rules of decision in a case (as Hart notes that can be 
rules, but special rules in that they create other rules), confused some courts, largely 
because Cardozo was not precise in the way he discussed duty and liability. See H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Thus, some courts have adopted foreseeability 
rules of liability in tort. But as the research in the Appendix discloses, a number of 
courts have now come to realize that a rule of liability based on foreseeability alone puts 
too much weight upon foreseeability as a determinant of liability. See Appendix, infra. 
Thus, I could adopt a rule, "I eat when I am hungry," based upon the most important 
factor in determining when I am to eat-if I am hungry. But my experience is that the 
rule is too broad and must give way to other factors (or I surely will be indescribably 
corpulent). 
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oft cited) Palsgraf Revisited. As the leading torts scholar, and the most 
prominent academic analyst of questions of duty, Prosser's works have 
been a natural place to which courts have turned for guidance in 
developing approaches to duty. Prosser's foundational notions of duty 
were reflected in the California Supreme Court during the heyday of its 
expansion of tort doctrine. Yet, California crafted and exported its own 
Prosser-inspired, specific policy-based approach. Many American 
jurisdictions have adopted or been influenced by the specific approach 
of California. When they differ with California, most courts nonetheless 
accept Prosser (Green) axioms. 
Particularly in light of the California experience (and Prosser's 
prominent role in strict product liability), duty conceived in terms of 
policy or other factors was identified with the liberal expansion of tort 
doctrine. Duty, which had a more traditional function of liability 
limitation, became a tool of liability expansion in the California cases of 
the 1950's to the 1970's. 
The relatively recent consolidation of consensus on Prosser (Green) 
notions of duty (many cases coming in the 80's and 90's) has, however, 
featured an intriguing turn. Prosser (Green) notions, and even Califor-
nia-influenced variants, have been used to limit liability and/or curtail 
the growth of liability law. Duty has thus been used in conservative 
ways. Consider, for example, the recent Alaska Supreme Court decision 
in Hawks v. State Department of Public Safety. 135 Alaska adopts 
California factors in its analysis of duty, 136 and in Hawks the Alaska 
Supreme Court reached a no-duty determination in light of those factors 
citing concerns of opening judicial floodgates in the process.137 The 
Alaska Supreme Court appeared to be influenced by some modern 
concerns expressed by tort reformers, and relied upon an expanded 
analysis of duty to incorporate this reasoning in its decisions. 
The expanded analysis of questions of duty proposed by Prosser 
(Green) is neither necessarily liberal nor conservative (as I defined those 
terms herein), but is compatible with doctrinal and liability expansion or 
contraction (or stasis). Expanded analysis can serve to deepen justifica-
tions for decisions, even those which preserve the status quo. Expanded 
analysis also facilitates legislative initiatives, because it clarifies the 
135. 908 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1995). 
136. Id. at 1016-17. 
137. Id. 
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bases for decision in the courts. Court decisions which rest upon 
unpopular policy balancing will be at risk of reversal in the legislature. 
Those which are popular may be codified. 
The recent consolidation of a consensus on basic Prosser (Green) 
axioms of duty represents an unusually poignant triumph of a particular 
jurisprudential viewpoint. American courts have elected to follow a 
moderate type of legal realism. American courts believe that duty turns 
on considerations of policy or other considerations (thus, the legal 
realism), but have not adopted anything like an extreme rule (a skeptical 
approach to tort law). Expanded analysis of duty has not been a 
substitute for rule-based adjudication, but has been a complement to that 
approach. 
H.L.A. Hart wrote that candor "is a sovereign virtue in jurispru-
dence"138 and argued for courts to recognize the "open texture of 
rules" and the existence of rule creating norms (in his terms, "secondary 
rules"). 139 Hart attacked jurisprudential extremists such as rule skep-
tics (those who would deny all validity to rules as such)140 and rule 
formalists (those who would refuse to recognize the open texture of 
rules, inter alia).141 American courts, in adopting the Prosser (Green) 
approach appear to have formed a tacit agreement with Hart on these 
points. American courts recognize the need for the expanded analysis 
of duty, but typically do not simply discard rules in favor of multi-factor 
balancing hither and thither. American courts have tacitly rejected rule 
formalism ( except perhaps in a few southeastern states which have not 
joined the consolidation of consensus on basic meanings of the term 
duty). Prosser's greatest legacy may be in his unprecedented success in 
facilitating this consensus. 
138. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 593, 593 (1958). 
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Alabama considers "the key factor [to be] whether the injury was 
foreseeable by the defendant." Smitherman v. McCafferty, 622 So. 2d 
322, 324 (Ala. 1993); see also Keebler v. Winfield Carraway Hospital, 
531 So. 2d 841, 844 (Ala. 1988). Although foreseeability is important, 
it is not always decisive. See Tittle v. Giattina, 597 So. 2d 679, 680 
(Ala. 1992). Alabama tort law accepts the proposition that "[i]n 
determining whether a duty exists in a given situation ... courts should 
consider a number of factors, including public policy, social consider-
ations, and foreseeability." Smitherman, 622 So. 2d at 324 (citing 57A 
AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 87, at 143 (1989)); see also Patrick v. Union 
State Bank, 681 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (Ala. 1996); Carrio v. Denson, 689 
So. 2d 121 (Ala. 1996); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 
(Cal. 1980) (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)); 574 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 87, n.62. In 
determining duty, the Alabama Supreme Court has relied upon 
foreseeability as well as five other factors in transactional/tort cases, 
traceable to Biankaja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958): 
[T]he extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the other person; 
(2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) tbe degree of certainty that he suffered 
injury; (4) tbe closeness oftbe connection between the defendant's conduct and 
the injury; (5) the moral blame attached to such conduct; and (6) tbe policy of 
preventing future harm. 
Tittle, 597 So. 2d at 680; see also North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Holley, 533 So. 2d 497, 501 (Ala. 1987); Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. 
v. Providence Hospital, 454 So. 2d 496, 502-03 (Ala. 1984); Howe v. 
Bishop, 446 So. 2d 11, 15 (Ala. 1984) (Torbert, C.J. concurring) 
(quoting United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 263 S.E.2d 313, 318 (N.C. 
App. 1980)); Rudolph v. First Southern Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, 414 So. 2d 64, 68 (Ala. 1982). 
As do some other states, Alabama asserts that "[t]he essential question 
is 'whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against 
the defendant's conduct."' Smitherman, 622 So: 2d at 324 (quoting W. 
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PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 53, at 357 (5th ed. 1984)); see Patrick, 681 So. 2d at 1368-69. 
In citing American Jurisprudence, Alabama follows the basic Prosser 
(Green) idea that duty involves the calculation of various factors. Heavy 
reliance on Prosser occurs in several Alabama cases raising issues of tort 
liability arising out of contractual reliance. See, e.g., Pope v. McCrory, 
575 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Ala. 1991); Harris v. Board of Water & Sewer 
Commissioners of The City of Mobile, 320 So. 2d 624, 628 (Ala. 1975). 
Alabama also relies on foreseeability, "however, in calculating duty. 
Alabama is a Prosser (Green) or Prosser (Green)/compatible jurisdiction. 
California decisional law has indirectly influenced Alabama tort 
jurisprudence on duty. 
2. ALASKA 
Alaska clearly follows the Prosser (Green) and California approaches. 
At least since Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 
1986), Alaska has clearly aligned itself with a fundamental Prosser 
(Green) axiom: "The concept of duty is not a legal talisman on which 
the court lays hands to decide novel questions, 'but only an expression 
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to 
say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.' " Hawks v. State 
Department of Public Safety, 908 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Alaska 1995) 
(quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS (4th ed. 1971)); Neakok, 721 P.2d at 1125 (quoting same). It is 
worth noting that the Hawks case determined that no duty was owed by 
the state to a mother who brought suit for emotional distress allegedly 
incurred because the state took many years to identify the remains of her 
deceased daughter who was killed by a serial killer. Hawks reached this 
conservative result following the California list of "considerations" 
adopted by Alaska in D.S. W v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School 
District, 628 P.2d 554, 555 (Alaska 1981). 
[The] court adopted a list of considerations [set forth by the California 
Supreme Court] to aid in deciding when, as a matter of policy, a particular 
plaintiff is entitled to protection. These considerations include the foreseeability 
of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an 
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the 
plaintiff's injury, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the 
policy of preventing further harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty of care, and the availability, 
cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Hawks, 908 P.2d at 1016; see also Waskey v. Anchorage, 909 P.2d 342, 
343-44 (Alaska 1996) (finding it unnecessary to consider the factors 
when previous cases are so similar to the facts in question); Day v. 
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Willis, 897 P.2d 78, 81 (Alaska 1995); Neakok, 721 P.2d at 1125; 
D.S. W, 628 P.2d at 555. 
Alaska, following Tarasoff, also believes that "[t]he most important 
single criterion for imposing a duty of care is foreseeability." Neakok; 
721 P.2d at 1125; see also Maddox v. River & Sea Marine, Inc. 925 
P.2d 1033, 1037 (Alaska 1996); R.E. v. State, 878 P.2d 1341, 1346 
(Alaska 1994). Nonetheless, it is clear that even where foreseeability 
weighs in favor of imposing a duty, Alaska is willing to allow other 
considerations to outweigh foreseeability, if appropriate. Hawks, 908 
P.2d at 1017 (placing emphasis on concerns of opening the ''judicial 
floodgates" in imposing a duty and noting that "[ d]ecisions regarding the 
allocation of limited [investigative] resources are better left to the 
executive branch"). 
3. ARlzONA 
In recent times, the Arizona Supreme Court has emphasized, following 
Cardozo, the importance of foreseeability. "As Chief Judge Cardozo 
stated in Palsgraf . .. , '[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the 
duty to be obeyed."' Alhambra School District v. County of Maricopa, 
796 P.2d 470, 473 (Ariz. 1990) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)). Arizona accepts that duty 
does not equal specification of a standard of conduct; duty and breach 
of duty are to be distinguished. Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condos 
Homeowners Ass'n, 941 P.2d 218 (Ariz. 1997); Markowitz v. Arizona 
Parks Board, 706 P.2d 364, 367 (Ariz. 1985). 
The Arizona Supreme Court has specifically adopted Prosser's policy-
based notion of duty, that it is not sacrosanct, but is policy-based and 
relational. See Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 208 (Ariz. 1983) 
(quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 42, at 244 (5th ed. 1984)). But the court has not followed 
California's lead on a list of factors. While certain intermediate 
appellate court decisions feature Prosser and Tarasoff policy factors, see 
Newman 'V. Maricopa County, 808 P.2d 1253, 1257 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991) and Cooke v. Berlin, 735 P.2d 830, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), 
overruled by Dunn v. Carruth, 784 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1989) (but policy 
factors remain fine),. the Supreme Court of Arizona refers to the use of 
"policy" in terms of common law development and stare decisis: 
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[T]he common law, which is judge-made and judge-applied, can and will be 
changed when changed conditions and circumstances establish that it is unjust 
or has become bad public policy . . .. " Inherent in the common law is a 
dynamic principle which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet changing 
needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which, if correctly understood was not 
static .... 
Id. (quoting Lewis v. Wolf, 596 P.2d 705, 706 (Ariz. App. 1979)). 
Arizona accepts important Prosser (Green) postulates that duty is not 
sacrosanct, but is policy based and duty is relational. Id. at 208. 
4. ARKANSAS 
Citing Prosser and Keeton, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated 
recently that "[t]he existence of a duty depends upon whether a relation 
exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal 
obligation upon one for the benefit of the other." Register v. Oaklawn 
Jockey Club Inc., 811 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Ark. 1991); see Shannon v. 
Wilson, 947 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1997); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 235 (5th ed. 1984). 
Such Prosser-like, duty-is-relational language has not been complement-
ed with other such Prosser (Green) assertions. However, in a very recent 
case involving a question of landowner duties, the Arkansas court did 
admit to "policy reasons in favor of the common law" and cited to and 
quoted from two cases in which explicit policy-factor balancing 
occurred. Driggers v. Locke, 913 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Ark. 1996). In that 
case, one of the dissenters asserted: 
In determining whether a duty exists, a court should consider the foreseeabil-
ity of harm, the degree of certainty of damages, the closeness of connection 
between defendant's conduct and the damage, the moral blame for the conduct, 
who could have best prevented the damage, the policy of preventing future 
damage, and the overall consequence to the state for imposing a duty. 
Id. at 276 (Newbern, J., dissenting). This dissenter did not support his 
assertion with citation or authority, but its kinship to the California 
policy factors is unmistakable. 
Arkansas has shown glimpses of the Prosser (Green) and California 
approaches, yet has rejected relying on public policy factors to create a 
new common law rule, instead deferring questions to the legislature 
regarding new common law rights. See Lewis v. Rowland, 701 S.W.2d 
122, 124 (Ark. 1985). However, the Arkansas Supreme Court has still 
relied upon conclusory assertions such as, "under our well established 
principles of common law duty and the facts before us, we find that duty 
existed ... ," even in a case presenting a novel problem of duty, for 
example, the extent of economic loss rule. Register, 811 S.W.2d at 317 
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(plaintiff asserts duty against racetrack arising from failure of the betting 
machines to accurately place bet, costing plaintiff a share of the prize). 
And in Lewis, which explicitly left open the question of whether to 
recognize a child's action for loss of consortium of an injured parent to 
the legislature, the Arkansas Supreme Court nonetheless engaged in an 
extensive explicit discussion of a variety of policy factors, including 
insurances, burden on a tortfeasor, multiplicity of claims and opening the 
floodgates of litigation. Lewis, 701 S.W.2d at 123. 
5. CALIFORNIA 
The heyday of the liberal California Supreme Court is over, but the 
California Supreme Court still adheres to the basic Prosserism that duty 
is a conclusion, not sacrosanct, and expresses the sum of considerations 
of policy. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 761 (Cal. 
1992). The more recent, and conservative, California Supreme Court has 
emphasized that duty can serve to limit liability, a view of duty close to 
Cardozo's in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) 
and H.R. Moch Co. v. Rennselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 
1928)). See Bily, 834 P.2d at 761; Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 
P.2d 728, 732 (Cal. 1980); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 916 (Cal. 
1968). California has demonstrated that a policy-based Prosser like 
approach to general and/or abstract questions of duty is compatible with 
liability limiting decisions. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 
P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (investors unable to recover under a negligence 
theory against auditor). 
California has developed one of the most sophisticated poli-
cy/consideration balancing approaches of any American jurisdiction. 
California typically tailors the appropriate list of considerations to the 
type of case presented.1 See Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 
70, 80 (Cal. 1997) (adding factors in cases involving deliberative 
conduct). One set of policy factors typically appears in questions of 
general negligence. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 
1968); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). Another similar 
set of factors will be used in cases involving questions of contract and 
economic loss issues. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 761; Biakanja v. Irving, 
1. Adler, supra note 10, at 904-02 & n.154. 
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320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958). Yet another set of factors will be used in 
questions of governmental or public liability. See Raymond v. Paradise 
Unified School District, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852 (Cal. 1963). The root of 
the California policy consideration approach is Biakanja: 
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable 
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing 
of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was 
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and injury suffered, the moral blame attached 
to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm. 
320 P.2d at 19 (regarding contract/tort matters). Biakanja specifically 
created this list of factors with Prosser (Green) in mind. Over time this 
list has been repeated and/or modified to fit other fact patterns. See, 
e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Rowland v. Christian, 
443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). · 
6. COLORADO 
Colorado strongly relies upon its own version of multi-factor analysis 
in questions of duty, a position heavily influenced by California law. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted Prosser's position 
that, "A court's conclusion th.at a duty does or does not exist is 'an 
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead 
the law to say that the plaintiff is [or is not] entitled to protection."' 
University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 57 (Colo. 1987) (quoting 
W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 53, at 358 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 
P.2d 530, 536 (Colo. 1993); Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 356 
(Colo. 1992). 
Since Smith v. County of Denver, 726 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Colo. 1986), 
the Colorado Supreme Court has "set forth several factors to be 
considered in determining the existence of duty in a particular case." 
Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 57. As stated in Smith: 
Whether the law should impose a duty requires consideration of many factors 
including, for example, the risk involved, the foreseeability and likelihood of 
injury as weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude 
of the burden of guarding against injury or harm, and the consequences of 
placing the burden upon the actor. 
Smith, 726 P.2d at 1127; see also Greenberg, 845 P.2d at 536; see 
Casebolt, 829 P.2d at 356; Peterson v. Halsted, 829 P.2d 373, 379 
(Colo. 1992); Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 57. The list of factors used by 
Colorado significantly overlaps with factors used in California, but is 
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most similar to a list of the factors important in determining the standard 
of conduct set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 289-293 
(1977). 
In addition, Colorado has pointed out that "this list was not intended 
to be exhaustive and does not exclude the consideration of other factors 
that may become relevant based upon the competing individual, public 
and social interests implicated in the facts of each case." Whitlock, 744 
P.2d at 57; see also Taco Bell v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. 1987). 
Relying upon the current edition of Prosser, Colorado has made 
favorable reference to factors referred therein, Whitlock, 744 P.2d at 57 
(citing and quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 358, 359 & n.24 (5th ed. 1984)), and to 
factors used specifically by the California courts. Id. at 57 & n.2 ( citing, 
inter alia, Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(relying upon California factors); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 
(Cal. 1968); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 359 n.24 (5th ed. 1984) (itself citing to and 
quoting to California factors)). Colorado duty jurisprudence follows 
Prosser and has strong affinities with California's approach. In addition, 
Colorado, as many other jurisdictions, has used multi-factor balancing 
to reach no duty results, see, e.g., Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, as well as pro-
duty results, see, e.g., Greenberg, 845 P.2d 530. 
7. CONNECTICUT 
The Connecticut Supreme Court·has adopted and applied Prosser's 
position on duty. In RK Constructors v. Fusco Corp., 650 A.2d 153 
(Conn. 1994), the Supreme Court of Connecticut "recognize[d] 'that 
"duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum 
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the 
plaintiff is entitled to protection."' Id. at 156 ( quoting W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984)); 
see also Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332 (Conn. 1997); Zamstein v. 
Marvasti, 692 A.2d 781, 786 (Conn. 1997); Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 
A.2d 852, 859-60 (Conn. 1996); Waters v. Autuori, 676 A.2d 357, 361 
(Conn. 1996). In the context of considering an attorney's duty to a non-
client, the Connecticut Supreme Court has considered the policy factors 
emphasized by the California Supreme Court after Biakanja v. Irving, 
320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958). See Krawczyk v. Stingle, 543 A.2d 733, 735-
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36 (Conn. 1988) (citation omitted). Connecticut traditionally has placed 
great emphasis on foreseeability as a major determinant of duty, see 
Clohessy, 675 A.2d at 859; R.K. Constructors, 650 A.2d at 155-56; 
Frankovitch v. Burton, 440 A.2d 254 (Conn. 1981); Noebel v. Housing 
Authority of the City of New Haven, 148 A.2d 766 (Conn. 1959); Orlo 
v. Connecticut Co., 21 A.2d 402 (Conn. 1941). However, in recent 
times especially, Connecticut has emphasized that, "[a]simple conclu-
sion that the harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable, however, cannot by 
itself mandate a determination that a legal duty exists. Many harms are 
quite literally 'foreseeable,' yet for pragmatic reasons, no recovery is 
allowed." R.K. Constructors, 650 A.2d at 156; see also Waters, 676 
A.2d 357 (professional organization promulgating professional account-
ing standards owes no duty to unknown third party relying upon opinion 
of C.P.A. who claimed to use these standards); Fraser v. United States, 
674 A.2d 811 (Conn. 1996) (declining to impose duty on psychotherapist 
to control dangerous outpatient with respect to unidentifiable victims); 
Maloney v. Conroy, 545 A.2d 1059 (Conn. 1988) (limiting bystanders' 
rights to recover emotional distress damages). 
8. DELAWARE 
Although Delaware's jurisprudence of duty at the abstract and/or 
general level is not as developed as some jurisdictions, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has made favorable reference to Prosser's notion that 
duty is a policy consideration. In Furek v. University of Delaware, 594 
A.2d 506 (Del. 1991), the Delaware Supreme Court relied upon a 
balancing of policy factors in determining that a university owes a duty 
to its students to protect them against fraternity hazing injuries: 
As noted by [Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d, 135, 138 (3rd Cir. 1979)] ... , 
"duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only the sum total of those considerations 
of policy which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection." 
Furek, 594 A.2d at 522 (quoting Bradshaw, quoting WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 333 (3d ed. 1964)). 
Many courts, like the Delaware Supreme Court, which have acknowl-
edged Prosser (Green) multi-factor balancing, deal openly with their 
roles vis-a-vis the legislature. In McCall v. Villa Pizza, Inc., 636 A.2d 
912 (Del. 1994), the Delaware Supreme Court specifically deferred 
consideration of a question of tavern owner liquor liability to the 
legislature on policy grounds. "[T]he determination of whether to 
impose liability on tavern owners for injuries caused by intoxicated 
patrons involves significant public policy considerations and is best left 
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to the General Assembly." Id. at 913 (citing Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 
554, 556 (Del. 1981)). 
9. FLORIDA 
In the last two decades or so in particular, Florida has begun to 
consider and discuss problems of duty in more general and abstract 
ways. Florida's approach to such questions of duty is eclectic and refers 
to Prosser (Green) notions of duty, California policy factors, and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Florida has also developed a notable 
approach to the question of foreseeability as it relates to duty and 
proximate causation. 
In Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1982), an action involving 
student injuries arising from a hazing incident, the Florida Supreme 
Court relied upon a Prosser (Green) approach to delineate a duty. Id. at 
666-67. Describing that approach as "pragmatically and socially 
oriented," Rupp quoted from Prosser's fourth edition for the proposition 
that duty is not sacrosanct, but the sum of policy considerations. Id. at 
667. Rupp went on to consider the interplay of various policy factors. 
Id. at 667-68. 
In two cases involving transactional harm/economic loss, the Florida 
Supreme Court has referenced California factors used in Biakanja v. 
Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958). See First Florida Bank v. Max Mitchell 
& Co., 558 So. 2d 9, 12 (Fla. 1990) (considering accountant's liability 
regarding preparation of financial statements); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. 
Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 401 (Fla. 1973) (general contractor can sue 
architect or engineer even in absence of privity); see also Casa Clara 
Condominium Ass'n v. Topino, 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993) (limiting 
A.R. Moyer, Inc. to its facts). 
Florida has also turned to the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 
recognizing the sources of duty. See McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 
593 So. 2d 500, 503 & n.2 (Fla. 1992); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 285 (1977). 
Most notably, Florida has recently taken great care in focusing upon 
foreseeability and how foreseeability plays out in the prima facie case. 
Blending aspects of Cardozo's and Andrews' visions of the role of 
foreseeability, Florida has asserted that foreseeability plays a legal role 
in the calculation of· duty and a factual role with respect to proximate 
causation. McCain, 593 So. 2d at 500, 502-03. 
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10. GEORGIA 
Currently, the Georgia Supreme Court comports with Prosser's "little 
analysis of duty" observations, at least in terms of general or abstract 
duty analysis. Cases like Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 
693 (Ga. 1982), are typical in that the Georgia Supreme Court is content 
to recite or rely upon the four standard elements of a cause of action in 
negligence, of which duty is the first element, to state a general standard 
of care and then move to a discussion of the more particular specifica-
tion of the general standard of care. See City of Rome v. Jordan, 426 
S.E.2d 861 (Ga. 1993); Bradley, 296 S.E.2d at 695; Lee Street Auto 
Sales, Inc. v. Warren, 116 S.E.2d 243, 245 (Ga. App. 1960). Georgia's 
intermediate appellate courts have made passing reference to notions of 
policy in calculating duty. See, e.g., Dupree v. Keller Industries, Inc., 
404 S.E.2d 291, 294 (Ga. App. 1991). 
11. HA.WA.II 
For over twenty years Hawaii has repeatedly adopted the basic Prosser 
(Green) notion that duty is not sacrosanct, but the expression of policy 
considerations. See Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 532 P.2d 673, 
675 (Haw. 1975); see also Hays v. City and County of Honolulu, 917 
P.2d 718, 725 (Haw. 1996); Waugh v. University of Hawaii, 621 P.2d 
957, 970 (Haw. 1980). The Hawaii Supreme Court has favorably cited 
similar assertions in Tarasoff. See Waugh, 621 P.2d at 970. 
Hawaii has recognized that new duties constantly arise in light of 
changing social conditions. See Hays, 917 P.2d at 725 (quoting 
Johnston v. KFC National Management Co., 788 P.2d 159, 161 (Haw. 
1990) (itself quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 359 (5th ed. 1984))). However, Hawaii has 
also noted from the beginning that policy considerations can limit 
liability as well. Waugh, 621 P.2d at 970; Kelley, 532 P.2d at 675. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court has not adopted California policy factors 
as such. But see Lee v. Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324 (Haw. 1996) 
( engaging in extensive policy based analysis of duty including factors 
used in California). Rather, the Hawaii Supreme Court has expressed its 
own, similar list of considerations. In a recent decision synthesizing 
several lines of authority, Hao v. Campbell Estate, 869 P.2d 216 (Haw. 
1994), the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that questions of the analysis of 
duty are guided by three basic principles: 
(1) duty is relational and relates to protecting interests, vel non, of 
plaintiff. 
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(2) whether duty exists is a question of fairness that involves a weighing 
of the nature of the risk, the magnitude of the burden of guarding 
against the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution. 
(3) the court "will not 'impose a new duty upon members of our society 
without any logical, sound, and compelling reasons taking into 
consideration the social and human relationships of our society[.]"' 
Id. at 219 (citations omitted). 
Hawaii features a highly developed [and developing] jurisprudence of 
general questions of duty, which follows Prosser (Green) axioms and is 
compatible with, although different from, the California policy factors. 
Hawaii also features Restatement-like/Prosser-like interests analysis and 
relational analysis. 
12. IDAHO 
Idaho follows the California, Prosser inspired, policy balancing 
approach, but only in certain circumstances. According to Idaho's 
highest court, "We only engage in a balancing . . . in those rare 
situations when we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope 
previously imposed, or when a duty has not previously been recog-
nized." Rife v. Long, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (Idaho 1995). Following a 
long line of California precedent, including Thompson v. County of 
Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980) and Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 
561 (Cal. 1968), the Idaho court has asserted: 
Determining whether a duty will arise in a particular instance involves a 
consideration of policy and the weighing of several factors which include . . . 
[t]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the 
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's 
conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise 
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 
Id. (citing Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 
1985)); see also Toner v. Lederle wboratories, 732 P.2d 297, 317 
(Idaho 1987) (Bakes, J., specially concurring in part). 
In Rife, Idaho applied this approach to reach a conservative result. 
Rife, 908 P.2d at 149 (declining to extend common law duty so as to 
protect a student, injured off of school premises, after school adjourned 
for the day and the student was released). 
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13. ILLINOIS 
The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly cited and relied upon 
Prosser (Green) for the notion that duty is not sacrosanct but a determi-
nation of policy and other social considerations: "[A] court's determina-
tion of duty reflects the policy and social requirements of the time and 
community." Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 513 
N.E.2d 387, 396 (Ill. 1987); see also Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 
605 N.E.2d 493, 501 (Ill. 1992); Nelson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 
465 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1984); Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 367 N.E.2d 
1250 (Ill. 1977); Mieher v. Brown, 301 N.E. 2d 307, 310 (Ill. 1973). 
In Illinois, foreseeability is prominent in the analysis of duty, yet "the 
imposition of a duty does not depend upon foreseeability alone." Rowe 
v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1369 (Ill. 1988). Illinois 
looks to other policy considerations "such as the likelihood of injury, the 
magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the 
consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant .... " Lee, 605 
N.E.2d at 501; see also Deibert v. Bauer Brothers Construction Co., 566 
N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ill. 1990); Rowe, 531 N.E.2d at 1370. When 
appropriate, Illinois also looks to public policy as expressed in the 
legislature. See Kirk, 513 N.E.2d at 396-97. Although there are some 
overlapping factors between Illinois's and California's approaches, 
Illinois has followed its own path in developing appropriate consider-
ations and has declined the opportunity to adopt specific California 
factors. See Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill. 1982) 
(preferring an alternative approach to that used in Biakanja regarding 
attorney duties to non-client third parties2). 
2. In choosing not to use the multi~factor liability test, the Pelham court 
nonetheless pointed out that under that test, the "predominant inquiry has generally 
resolved to one criterion"-the one adopted as. the basis of rule in Pelham, 440 N.E.2d 
at 100. Jurisprudentially, one could easily view Pelham not as a rejection of Biakanja, 
but as a final determination, in terms of a rule of the balancing process. The California 
Supreme Court has done this sort of thing. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 
1989) (Dillon's open-ended inquiry reduced to a distinct set of rules). Illinois, not 
clearly distinguishing between meta-criteria and rules, see infra at IV, hesitated to reject 
a balancing test in favor of a specific rule. One tell tale sign that this may have been 
the case is that the Pelham court does not refer to its own, typically cited, balancing act. 
1540 
[VOL. 34: 1503, 1997] 
14. INDIANA 
Negligence Law 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Recently, Indiana has taken significant steps in focusing its jurispru-
dence of duty, which has been heavily influenced by Prosser. In Gariup 
Construction Co. v. Foster, 519 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. 1988), the Supreme 
Court of Indiana recognized that a "determination [of duty, vel non] is 
not without difficulty," and quoted extensively from PROSSER ON TORTS 
(5th ed.), supra note 7, to the effect that duty is an expression of policy 
considerations. Id. at 1227 (quoting the factors listed in the text of that 
edition of the Prosser treaties,3 w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 357-59 (5th ed. 1984)). Gariup 
emphasized the role of the legislature in developing public policy and, 
in light of that, chose a conservative rule (deciding whether to change 
the common law rule which did not extend liquor liability to a primarily 
social host). Id. at 1228. 
Indiana shortly revisited the question of duty and concluded, in light 
of Gariup, "that three factors must be balanced, viz. (1) the relationship 
between the parties, (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the 
person injured, and (3) public policy concerns." Webb v. Jarvis, 575 
N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1991); see also Blake v. Calumet Construction 
Corp., 674 N.E.2d 167 (Ind. 1996). With respect to the third factor, 
public policy, the Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed its kinship to 
Prosser by relying upon Prosser's notion that duty is not sacrosanct but 
an expression of policy considerations. Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 997 
(quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 53 (5th ed. 1984)). 
Since Webb, the Indiana Supreme Court has settled on this Prosser 
inspired (but not the California variant) approach to questions of duty. 
See Hooks Superx, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ind. 1994); 
Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. 
1994); Erie Insurance Co. v. Hickman By Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515, 518 
(Ind. 1993). Unlike in California, the Indiana Supreme Court prefers to 
discuss public policy factors ( other than foreseeability and relational 
matters) that are relevant to the specifics of the case presented ( as such, 
there are fewer general public policy factors in Indiana). See, e.g., 
3. The court did not advert to n.2 on p. 359 of Prosser's text, which references 
California factors. See Gariup, 519 N.E.2d at 1227. 
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Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 997 (deciding that public policy factors weigh 
"against imposing a duty on physicians to consider unknown third 
persons in deciding whether or not to prescribe a course of drug therapy 
for a patient."). In addition, the Indiana Supreme Court, when consider-
ing governmental liability, distinguishes between public and private 
duties. Mullin, 639 N.E.2d at 283. 
15. IOWA 
As in many jurisdictions, economic loss/transactional negligence issues 
in Iowa have generated abstract and general inquiries into the nature of 
duty in negligence law. Recently, the Iowa Supreme Court acknowl-
edged Prosser's position that duty is not sacrosanct, but the expression 
of policy considerations in that particular case. Teunissen v. Orkin 
Exterminating Co., 484 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Iowa 1992). In the context 
of a case where a home pest exterminator was sued by a non-privy 
subsequent owner of the home for negligence in performing the pest 
extermination contract, the Iowa Supreme Court refused to extend 
liability so as to legally protect the interests of the subsequent homeown-
er. Id. at 592. Discussing a previous decision, Ryan v. Kanne, 170 
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969), in which privity requirements were relaxed in 
favor of imposing liability, the Teunissen Court said: 
Considerations of policy led to the requirement of privity in the first place. 
Considerations of policy led to the relaxation of the privity requirement in 
Ryan. But we drew the line in Ryan ... [to the effect that, here, plaintiff's] 
interests are not entitled to legal protection. 
484 N.W.2d at 592. 
16. KANSAS 
Kansas has stated and reaffirmed the following basic notions of duty: 
1. As Prosser and the Restatement (Second) would agree, duty relates to "the 
invasion of a legally protected interest." Blackmore v. Auer, 357 P.2d 765, 
771 (Kan. 1960); see also Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823, 829 (Kan. 1995). 
2. Duty is relational: as in Palsgraf, apprehension of risk, foreseeability, is 
critical in determining duty. Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1995); 
Durfiinger v. Artiles, 673 P.2d 86 (Kan. 1983); Blackmore v. Auer, 357 P.2d 
765 (Kan. 1960) (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 
1928)). 
In addition, Kansas has adopted and relied upon California factors in 
determining duty owed. See Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 49 (Kan. 
1990) (adopting California liability tests in legal malpractice case 
brought by potential beneficiaries of inter vivos trust and following 
Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958), as well as Lucas v. Hamm, 
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364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)); see also Nero v. Kansas State University, 861 
P.2d 768, 777-79 (1993) (discussing California factors and imposing 
duty upon university which assigned accused rapist to co-ed dorm who 
then sexually assaulted another student in that dorm). 
17. KENTUCKY 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has asserted, in a Heaven v. Pender 
vein, that, "[t]he requirement of a 'duty to all' is a beginning point for 
any duty analysis." Fryman v. Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Ky. 
1995). Although Kentucky emphasizes foreseeability in analyzing duty 
("we have determined that the major issue is the question of foreseeabili-
ty"), Kentucky has pointed out that "consideration must be given to 
public policy, statutory and common law theories in order to determine 
whether a duty existed in a particular situation." Id. at 909. 
Kentucky has been sensitive to the artificial character of conclusions 
of duty/no duty, and has followed and applied Prosser's idea that duty 
is a conclusion regarding policy. See Gas Service Co. v. City of London, 
687 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Ky. 1985) (quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 853, at 357-58 (5th ed. 
1984) and paraphrasing G. E. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA, AN 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 17-18 (1980)); see also Perry v. Williamson, 
824 S.W.2d 869, 875 (Ky. 1992); Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles 
v. Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ky. 1987). In Perry, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court, in discussing landowner duties, noted the conclusory, 
label-like quality of the categories of entrant status. 824 S.W.2d at 875. 
Holding that entrant status categorization is an important factor in 
analyzing landowner liability, Perry nonetheless held that, 
such status is by no means the end of the inquiry. An enlightened legal system 
does not reason backward from labels, to decide whether a duty of reasonable 
care exits [sic]. It reasons forward from circumstances, using foreseeability, the 
gravity of the potential harm, and the possessor's right to control his property, 
to decide what is reasonable conduct in the circumstances and what is 
negligence. 
Perry, 824 S.W.2d at 875 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
& KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (5th ed. 1984)). 
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18. LOUISIANA 
Louisiana, which follows its own jurisprudential path, has been 
influenced by Prosser's notion that duty is an expression of policy 
concerns. In a negligence action, Louisiana follows what it refers to as 
a "duty-risk" analysis, which consists of a familiar, if unusually ordered, 
prima-facie case (cause in fact, duty, breach, and a proximate cause 
equivalent). Fox v. Board of Supervisors of Lousiana State University, 
576 So. 2d 978, 981 (La. 1991). Louisiana views duties as relational 
and in terms of public and social policy. Id. at 981 ( citing W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (5th 
ed. 1984)); see also LeJeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital, 556 So. 2d 559, 
566 (La. 1990). 
The court must make a policy determination in light of the unique facts of the 
case. Thus, the duty-risk analysis requires the court to take into account the 
conduct of each party as well as the particular circumstances of the case . . . . 
In determining whether to impose a duty in a particular situation, the court may 
consider various moral, social, and economic factors, including whether the 
imposition of a duty would result in an unmanageable flow of litigation; the 
ease of association between the plaintiff's harm and the defendant's conduct; 
the economic impact on society as well as the economic impact on similarly 
situated parties; the nature of the defendant's activity; moral considerations, 
particularly victim fault; and precedent as well as the direction in which society 
and its institutions are evolving. 
Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 233 (La. 1994); see also Pitre v. 
Opelousas General Hospital, 530 So. 2d 1151, 1156-57, 1161 (La. 
1988). Pitre acknowledged that duty is "more apt to direct attention to 
the policy issues[,]" is a "mere[] verbal expression[] of [a] policy 
decision[,]" and cautioned that "[a]llusions to policy should not be made 
a substitute for more determinate legal principles when they may be 
utilized." Pitre, 530 So.2d at 1155-56. "Policy considerations do indeed 
shape one's sense of the right decision, but whenever possible these 
should be given effect through the indispensable minimum of principles 
of liability in negligence, nebulous though they may be in themselves." 
Id. Louisiana tort (delict) jurisprudence features a heavy helping of 
policy analysis, with its own flavor. 
19. MAINE 
The hand of Prosser has been evident in recent Maine decisions. 
Maine sees duty in terms of policy, and as relational. And although 
Maine places great emphasis on foreseeability in determining duty, 
Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279, 282 (Me. 1992), the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court has stated that duty "is not entirely a question of the 
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foreseeable risk of harm but is in turn dependent on recognizing and 
weighing relevant policy implications . . . . Foreseeability . . . is one 
consideration among many that must be taken into account when courts 
engage in a duty analysis."4 
In determining which policy factors, other than foreseeability, to rely 
upon, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has turned to Prosser: "We 
have observed that many factors can influence the duty determination, 
including 'the hand of history, our ideals of morals and justice, the 
convenience of administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to 
where the loss should fall."' Williams v. Inverness Corp., 664 A.2d 
1244, 1246 (Me. 1995) (quoting William Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953)); see also Cameron, 610 A.2d at 282; 
Trusiani v. Cumberland and York Distributors, Inc., 538 A.2d 258, 261 
(Me. 1988). Maine has recognized that these Prosser factors can include 
others as well. See Gammon v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, 534 
A.2d 1282, 1286 (Me. 1987). Thus, in Hughes v. Beta Upsilon Building 
Ass'n, 619 A.2d 525 (Me. 1993), the Supreme Judicial Court stated: 
"Just as control and foreseeability are factors in a duty analysis, so is the 
relationship of the parties." Id. at 527. And in Cameron, that court 
emphasized "the necessity of. avoiding both unlimited liability and 
liability out of all proportion to culpability." 610 A.2d at 283. 
20. MARYLAND 
Maryland, which has considered the question of duty in great depth, 
follows Prosser and has specifically adopted California factors in 
determining duty. Following Prosser, the Maryland Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that duty is not sacrosanct but is an expression of the 
balancing of policy considerations to determine whether a plaintiff's 
interests are entitled to protection. See Jacques v. First National Bank 
of Maryland, 515 A.2d 756, 759 (Md. 1986); see also Rosenblatt v. 
Exxon, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (Md. 1994); Village of Cross Keys, Inc. v. 
U.S. Gypsum, Co. 556 A.2d 1126, 1131 (Md. 1989); Ashburn v. Anne 
Arundel County, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Md. 1986). 
4. Cameron did not adopt specific California factors as such but the court did cite 
and refer to California decisional law with respect to its duty as "policy" and 
"foreseeability if not all" conclusions. 610 A.2d at 282-85. 
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Following California's Tarasoff, Maryland has repeatedly relied upon 
the factors stated therein as "among the variables to be considered in 
determining whether a tort duty should be recognized." Village of Cross 
Keys, Inc., 556 A.2d at 1131; see also Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 633 
A.2d 84, 88 (Md. 1993); Eisel v. Board of Education of Montgomery 
County, 591 A.2d 447, 452 (Md.1991). Maryland also considers other 
factors where appropriate, including "the relationships of the parties and 
the nature of the actual or foreseeable harm." Village of Cross Keys, 
556 A.2d at 1131; Jacques, 515 A.2d at 759. 
Foreseeability is prominent, Eisel, 597 A.2d at 452, and in some cases 
the Maryland Supreme Court has spoken of a foreseeability of harm test. 
Rosenblatt, 642 A.2d at 189; Henley v. Prince George's County, 503 
A.2d 1333, 1340 (Md. 1986). Maryland has linked the prominence of 
foreseeability - especially as a liability limiting tool - to Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). See Hartford Insurance Co. v. 
Manor Inn of Bethesda, 642 A.2d 219, 226 (Md. 1994); Henley, 503 
A.2d at 1341. 
21. MASSACHUSETTS 
Massachusetts follows its own beat. The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts has determined "that a duty finds its 'source in existing 
social values and customs."' Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 449 
N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1983) (noting Schofield v. Merrill, 435 N.E.2d 
339 (Mass. 1982)); see also Mosko v. Raytheon Corp., 622 N.E.2d 1066, 
1070 (Mass. 1993); Pridgen v. 'Boston Housing Authority,· 308 N.E.2d 
467, 477 (Mass. 1974); Mounsey v. Ellard, 291 N.E.2d 43, 52 (Mass. 
1973). 
22. MICHIGAN 
Michigan is a Prosser (Green) jurisdiction and has relied explicitly 
upon California factors in its jurisprudence, although emphasizing mostly 
relational and foreseeability factors. The Michigan Supreme Court 
agrees with Prosser (Green) that duty is an expression of policy concerns 
and is not sacrosanct. See Groncki v. Detroit Edison Co., 557 N.W.2d 
289, 296 (Mich. 1996); Buczkowksi v. McKay, 490 N.W.2d 330, 333 
(Mich. 1992); Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union, 327 N.W. 2d 
814, 817 (Mich. 1982); Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 590-91 
(Mich. 1981). In determining what factors count, Michigan has looked 
to sister jurisdictions, see, e.g., Buczkowski, 490 N.W. 2d at 333 & nn.6, 
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7, and Prosser (Green) and California factors. 5 Id. at 333 n.4; see also 
Schultz v. Consumers Power Co., 506 N.W.2d 175, 185 (Mich. 1993) 
(Griffin, J., dissenting). The Michigan Supreme Court appears to place 
greatest emphasis upon the factors of the parties' relationship and 
foreseeability. Schultz, 506 N.W.2d at 178. 
23. MINNESOTA 
Following Prosser, Minnesota accepts the idea that "[n]o duty is owed 
... unless the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against 
the defendant's conduct." M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 488 N.W.2d 
282, 287 (Minn. 1992) (citing L&H Airco v. Rapistan Corp., 446 
N.W.2d 372, 378 n.3 (Minn. 1989) (itself citing w. PAGE KEETON ET 
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 53, at 357 (5th ed. 
1984))). In Minnesota, public policy determines which interests are 
entitled to legal protection. M.H., 488 N.W.2d at 287; see also Vaughn 
v. Northwest Airlines, 558 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn. 1997); L&H Airco, 
446 N.W.2d at 378. In the context of determining duties owed by 
attorneys to non-clients, the Minnesota Supreme Court has followed 
California's lead by relying upon Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 
1961), and the California. factors stressed therein. See Admiral 
Merchants Motor Freight, Inc. v. O'.Connor & Hannan, 494 N.W.2d 
261,266 (Minn. 1992); Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4, 5-6 (Minn. 
1981). 
24. MISSISSIPPI 
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court has not extensively 
developed its analysis of duty, in Foster by Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 
967 (Miss. 1990), the court devoted a large section of its opinion to the 
question, "What is duty?," and another section to the analysis of 
5. Buczkowski asserted that "Dean Prosser described the several variables that 
consistently go to the heart of a court's determination of duty as including [the factors 
adopted in Tarasojf, etc., by the California courts]." 490 N.W.2d at 333 n.4. For that 
proposition, Buczkowski cited tow. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 359 n.24 (5th ed. 1984). 490 N.W.2d at 333 n.4. The 
treatise itself cites the Tarasoff California factors. The note in which the Tarasoff 
California factors appear was not Prosser' s personal handwork as it first appears after 
Prosser' s death, and the California factors are not precisely those Prosser the person 
advocated. 
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foreseeability. Id. at 972-76. In addition to emphasizing foreseeability 
and the difference between the general and concrete issues of duty, id. 
at 973 n.7, the Mississippi Supreme Court also extensively reviewed and 
quoted decisions from other jurisdictions, including Richard P. v. Vista 
Del Mar Child Care Services, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 373-74 (Cal. App. 
1980), a case using California policy factors. See Foster by Foster, 575 
So. 2d at 979. In Foster by Foster, the Mississippi Supreme Court was 
sensitive to a variety of factors and to decisions by other jurisdictions 
using a variety of factors. Id. at 981. 
25. MISSOURI 
The Missouri Supreme Court recently affirmed that "[a]ny question of 
duty depends upon a calculus of policy considerations." Lough v. Rolla 
Women's Clinic, 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993). In recent times the 
Missouri Supreme Court has been heavily influenced by California 
factors, which it has tailored for its own use. 
The Missouri Supreme Court has stated that the appropriate policy 
considerations 
include "the social consensus that the interest is worthy of protection; the 
foreseeability of harm and the degree of certainty that the protected person 
suffered injury; moral blame society attaches to the conduct; the prevention of 
further harm; considerations of cost and ability to spread the risks of loss; the 
economic burden upon the actor and the community." 
Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854 (quoting Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 
S.W.2d 251, 257 (Mo. App. 1982) (modifying California factors)); 
Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 
432 (Mo. 1985). In addition, "a relationship between the parties where 
one is acting for the benefit of another also plays a role." Lough, 866 
S.W.2d at 854 (citing Hoover·s Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, 
Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 432 (Mo. 1985); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 274 (5th ed. 
1984)). With respect to an attorney's legal duty to third party 
nonclients, a balancing test consisting of modified California factors 
(taken from Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) and Lucas v. 
Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)) is appropriate.6 See Donahue v. 
6. The six factors recognized by Missouri in this context are: 
(1) the existence of a specific intent by the client that the purpose of the 
attorney's services were to benefit the plaintiffs. 
(2) the foreseeability of the harm to the plaintiffs as a result of the attorney's 
negligence. 
(3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiffs will suffer injury from attorney 
misconduct. 
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Shughart, Thompson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 628-29 (Mo. 
1995); Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 81 (Mo. 1967) (balancing 
test applied to determine architect's duty to third party surety). 
Missouri typically considers foreseeability to be "the paramount factor 
in determining the existence of a duty[.]" Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854. 
Nonetheless, foreseeability is not the only factor; foreseeability has not 
been defined as coextensive with duty. See Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon 
Memorial Hospital, 799 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Mo. 1990). 
26. MONTANA 
The Montana Supreme Court, following Cardozo and California case 
law, believes that "foreseeability is of prime importance in establishing 
the element of duty .... " ,Mang v. Eliasson, 458 P.2d 777, 781 (Mont. 
1969) (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 
1928)); see also Busta v. Columbus Hospital Corp., 916 P.2d 122, 134 
(Mont. 1996); Estate of Strever v. Cline, 924 P. 2d 666, 670 (Mont. 
1996); Sacco v. High Country Independent Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 
422-23 (Mont. 1995) (citing Versland v. Caron Transportation, 671 P.2d 
583, 585 (Mont. 1983) (itself citing Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 
1968))). The Montana Supreme Court has devoted a great deal of 
analysis to questions raised in the Cardozo/ Andrews debate regarding the 
role of foreseeability in negligence law'. See Busta, 916 P.2d at 131-42. 
The Montana Supreme Court has been influenced by multi-factor 
balancing tests, especially California inspired tests. In one recent case, 
Contreraz v. Michellotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1122-23 (Mont. 1995), 
the court adopted the reasoning applied in Christensen v. Superior Court, 
820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991), quoting and making favorable reference to the 
California factors used in that California case. Further, in Phillips v. 
City of Billings, 758 P.2d 772, 774-75 (Mont. 1988), the Montana 
Supreme Court made favorable reference to several California factors 
regarding the alleged duty of the police with respect to protection of 
(4) the closeness of the connection between the attorney's conduct and the 
injury. · ·· 
(5) the policy of preventing further harm. 
(6) the burden on the profession of recognizing liability under the circum-
stances. 
Donahue v. Shughart, Thompson, & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo. 1995). 
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third parties from a potentially dangerous intoxicated motorist. Then, In 
Estate of Strever, the Montana Supreme Court adopted these factors: 
The existence of a duty of care depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and 
upon a weighing of policy considerations for and against the impostion of 
liability . . . . The policy considerations to be weighed in determining whether 
to impose a duty include: (1) the moral blame attached to the defendant's 
conduct; (2) the desire to prevent future harm; (3) the extent of the burden to 
the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to -
exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and ( 4) the availability, cost and 
prevalence of insurance for the ·risk involved. 
924 P.2d at 670 (citing Maguire v. State, 835 P.2d 755, 762 (Mont. 
1992); Phillips v. City of Billings, 758 P.2d 772, 775 (Mont. 1988)). See 
Jackson v. State of Montana, 956 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1998) (citing Singleton 
v. L.P. Anderson Supply Co., 943 P.2d 968 (Mont. 1997) and using a 
renumbered list of functionally similar factors). 
27. NEBRASKA 
Until very recently the Nebraska Supreme Court has not engaged in 
highly sophisticated analyses of duty. That court considers duty in terms 
of relevant factors. The principal factor in imposing duty is foreseeabili-
ty. See S.l. v. Cutler, 523 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Neb. 1994) (citing and 
quoting Cardozo in Palsgrafy. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99, 
100 (N.Y. 1928)) and see also Anderson v. Nebraska Department of 
Social Services, 538 N.W.2d 732, _ 738 (Neb. 1995) and Schmidt v. 
Omaha Public Power District, 515 N.W.2d 756, 763 (Neb. 1994). In a 
case involving the question of whether to impose a duty upon a landlord 
to protect a tenant from the criminal acts of a third person, the Nebraska 
Supreme Court stated: 
Factors to consider in imposing a duty -on a landlord include weighing the 
relationship of the parties 7 against the nature of the risk and the public interest 
in the proposed solution, the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden 
of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing that burden on 
a defendant. 
S.l. v. Cutler, 523 N.W.2d 242, 244 (Neb. 1994) (citing C.S. v. Sophir, 
368 N.W.2d 444 (Neb. 1985)). And in a recent case abolishing entrant 
status categories, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that a 
landowner's duty would turn on a variety of factors, which are similar 
7. In other cases, Nebraska has emphasized that duty is relational as well. See 
Anderson, 538 N.W.2d at 738 (citing Schmidt v. Omaha Pub. Power Dep't, 515 N.W.2d 
756 (Neb. 1994) (quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 53 (5th ed. 1984))). 
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to those used in California. Heins v. Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 
57 (Neb. 1996). 
Nebraska has also repeatedly turned to the notion that "'[a] duty in 
negligence cases may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will 
give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of 
conduct toward another."' Schmidt, 515 N.W.2d at 763 (quoting W. 
PAGE. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 53 (5th ed.)); s·ee also Critchfield v. McNamara, 532 N.W.2d 287, 292 
(Neb. 1995); S.l. Cutler, 523 N.W.2d at 244. 
In a very recent case, Popple v. Rose, 573 N.W.2d 765, 768-69 (Neb. 
1998), the Nebraska Supreme Court extensively discussed duty following 
Tarasoff and Prosser/Green. The court acknowledged the prominence of 
foreseeability and risk/utility considerations. 
28. NEVADA 
Explicitly following Prosser, Nevada takes the view that "[t]he concept 
of legal duty necessarily reflects considerations of social policy .... " 
Wiley v. Redd, 885 P.2d 592, 596 (Nev. 1994); see also Ashwood v. 
Clark County, 930 P.2d 740 (Nev. 1997); Turpel v. Sayles, 692 P.2d 
1290, 1292-93 (Nev. 1985) (quoting Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104, 
106 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting· Prosser's assertion that duty is not 
sacrosanct but an expression of policy considerations)). In a recent case, the Nevada Supreme Court used policy considerations 
in a conservative way and declined to impose a duty upon an alarm 
company on the grounds that to impose a burden on the defendant ( and 
similar defendants) would not work "a sound advancement in social 
policy." Wiley, 885 P.2d at 596... 
29. NEW HAMPSHIRE 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court acknowledges that duty "is an 
exceedingly artificial concept.". Libbey v. Hampton Water Works Co., 
389 A.2d 434, 435 (N.H. 1978); see also Walls v. Oxford Management 
Co., 633 A.2d 103, 105 (N.H. 1993). And, following Prosser, New 
Hampshire recognizes that duty is not sacrosanct but the expression of 
policy considerations. Williams v. O'Brien, 669 A.2d 810, 813 (N.H. 
1995); Stillwater Condominium Ass'n v. Town of Salem, 668 A.2d 38, 
40 (N.H. 1995); Walls; 633 A:2d at 105; Island Shores Estates 
CondominiumAss'n v. City of Concord, 615 A.2d 629,632 (N.H. 1992). 
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Duty as a policy matter focuses attention upon the relationship between 
the parties and upon whether plaintiff's interests deserve legal protection. 
See Stillwater, 668 A.2d at 40; Walls, 633 A.2d at 105; Doucette v. 
Town of Bristol, 635 A.2d 1387, 1391 (N.H. 1993); Libbey, 389 A.2d at 
435. Foreseeability is important in determining, particularly limiting, 
duty. See Walls·, 633 A.2d at 105; Goodwin v. James, 595 A.2d 504, 
507 (N.H. 1991). 
30. NEW JERSEY 
New Jersey has a long .tradition of evaluating questions of duty. 
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that, "[i]n most 
cases the justice of imposing a duty is so clear that the cause of action 
in negligence is assumed to exist simply on the basis of the actor's 
creation of an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm resulting in injury." 
Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (N.J. 1984). At times more 
analysis is required, '"more' being the value judgment, based on an 
analysis of public policy, that the actor owed the injured party a duty of 
reasonable care." Id. at 1222 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad 
Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928))
The New Jersey Supreme Court has repeatedly relied upon the 
following or similar8 formulations of duty: "whether a duty exists is 
ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the 
relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk ['that is its foreseeability 
and severity'9] and the public interest in the proposed solution." 
Goldberg v. Housing Authority of the City of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 
293 (N.J. 1962); see also Wang v. Allstate Insurance Co., 592 A.2d 527, 
534 (N.J. 1991); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital, 538 
A.2d 346, 349 (N.J. 1988); Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1222. In very recent 
cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court, recognizing that "the scope of a 
duty depends generally on the foreseeability of the corisequences of a 
negligent act, as limited by policy considerations and concerns for 
fairness," Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1286 (N.J. 1993), has noted 
that, "[a]lthough a foreseeable risk is the indispensable cornerstone of 
any formulation of a duty of care, .not all foreseeable risks give rise to 
duties." Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376 (N.J. 1994). 
8. "The imposition of a duty is the conclusion of a rather complex analysis that 
considers the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk-that is, its foreseeability 
and severity-and the impact the imposition of a duty would have on public policy." 
Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376 (N.J. 1994); see also Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 
600, 604 (N.J. 1994). . 
9. Id. 
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The New Jersey approach is compatible with the Prosser (Green) 
approach, and is influenced by Palsgraf and its emphasis on foreseeabili-
ty. Although New Jersey has used its approach to the analysis of duty 
to acknowledge new duties, see, e.g., Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 385 
(allowing "significant other" to recover as a bystander for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress), New Jersey has also very candidly used 
this approach to immunize defendants. In Crawn, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court observed: 
Anytime a court raises the standard of care that defines the legal duty that is 
owed for the safety of others, it implicitly immunizes a part of the conduct that 
otherwise would be considered tortious and actionable." In that case, relying 
upon a "multi-faceted analysis," the Court concluded that "liability arising out 
of mutual, informal, recreational sports activity should not be based on a 
standard of ordinary negligence but on the heightened standard of recklessness 
or intent to harm.. 
Crawn, 643 A.2d at 605. In one very recent case, dissenting Justice 
Garibaldi made use of California factors as they had been stated in an 
intermediate appellate court in New Jersey. See Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 
655 A.2d 1354, 1366 (N.J. 1995). 
31. NEW MEXICO 
According to the New Mexico Supreme Court, 
The determination of duty in any given situation involves analyzing the 
relationship of the parties, the plaintiff's injured interests and the defendant's 
conduct; it is essentially a · policy decision based on these factors that the 
plaintiff's interests are entitled to protection. 
Calkins, Jr. v. Cox Estates, 792 P.2d 36, 40 (N.M. 1990) (citing W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 53 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 
185, 190 (N.M. 1995) ("The recognition of a duty in any given situation 
is essentially a legal policy determination that the plaintiff's injured 
interests are entitled to protection .... The process involves an implicit 
balancing of interests .... ") (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 53 (4th ed. 1971); Calkins, 792 
P.2d at 39; Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 176 (N.M. 1995) ("For 
reasons of public policy, the common law of torts also recognizes an 
attorney's duty to provide professional services with the skill, prudence 
and diligence of attorneys of ordinary skill and capacity."); Solon v. Wek 
Drilling Co., Inc., 829 P.2d 645, 648 (N.M. 1992) ("[T]he problem is 
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one of social policy: where to draw the line against otherwise unlimited 
liability.") (citing and quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 43 (5th ed. 1984)). Foreseeability is 
critical in duty analysis in New Mexico. In one recent opinion, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court engaged in an intense analysis of the 
Cardozo/ Andrews debate in reaffirming the stance that duty is owed to 
foreseeable, not unforeseeable plaintiffs. See Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 
840, 843-44 (N.M. 1994); Solon, 829 P.2d at 648-49. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court has been willing to employ multi-
factor balancing tests to determine when a duty is owed, and has turned 
to California factors and a California-hybrid set of factors. In Steinberg 
v. Coda Roberson Construction Co., 440 P.2d 798,800 (N.M. 1968), the 
New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the California factors stated in 
Stewart v. Cox, 362 P.2d 345, 348 (Cal. 1961), to determine a 
contractor's liability to successive homeowners. See Leyba, 907 P.2d at 
178-79. In Leyba v. Whitley, 907 P.2d 172, 179-80, a case involving the 
duties of an attorney in a wrongful death action, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court chided its Courts of Appeals for rejecting balancing tests 
to resolve the case at hand, and therein adopted the multi-factor 
balancing test used by the Washington Supreme Court in Trask v. Butler, 
872 P.2d 1080, 1084 (Wash. 1994). The Washington Supreme Court 
uses a test that is a hybrid of California's test. See Washington, infra. 
32. NEW YORK 
New York has a rich and distinguished history of engaging in in-depth 
analysis of duty. Influences of Prosser, the California Courts, and of 
course Cardozo are evident, but New York follows a venerable and 
unique path. · 
New York's highest court has recently summarized a long line of 
authority regarding duty in Palka v. Servicemaster Management 
Services., Corp., 634 N.E.2d 189, 192, 193 (N.Y. 1994). According to 
Palka, the 
scope of an alleged tortfeasor's duty is usually a legal, policy-laden declaration 
reserved for Judges to make prior to submitting anything to fact-finding or jury 
consideration .... Common-law experience teaches that duty is not something 
derived or discerned from an algebraic formula. Rather, it coalesces from 
vectored forces including logic, science, weighty competing socioeconomic 
polices and sometimes contractual assumptions of responsibility. These sources 
contribute to pinpointing and apportioning of societal risks and to an allocation 
of burdens of loss and reparation on a fair, prudent basis. 
634 N.E.2d at 192 (citations omitted); see also Bocre Leasing Corp. v. 
General Motors Corp., 645 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (N.Y. 1995); Trombetta 
v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653, 655 (N.Y. 1993); Sommer v. Federal 
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Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (N.Y. 1992) (citing W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 
613 (4th ed. 1972), for the propositions that duty is social policy and 
that tort law is based upon social policy and protects various interests); 
Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 335 N.E.2d 275, 277 (N.Y. 
1975) (quoting Prosser for same); Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 
422 (N.Y. 1969) (referencing California factors). 
New York, of course, puts great emphasis on foreseeability, but that 
is not the end of the inquiry. Other factors are relevant as well: 
[T]he boundaries of duty are not simply contracted or expanded by the notion 
of foreseeability . . . . Courts traditionally and as part of the common-law 
process fix the duty point by balancing factors, including the reasonable 
expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the 
likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and 
reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the expansion or limitation 
of new channels of liability. 
Palka, 634 N.E.2d at 193 (citations omitted); see also Strauss v. Belle 
Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y. 1985). 
New York has shown great concern to ensure that liability will be 
circumscribed by fixing the "orbit of duty." Trombetta, 626 N.E.2d at 
655; see also Eaves Brooks Costume Co. Inc., v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 
556 N.E.2d 1093, 1096 (N.Y. 1990). New York has also come to 
recognize that duty - traditionally conceived in terms of defendant's 
perspective - "correspondingly necessitates an examination of an injured 
person's reasonable expectation of the care owed and the basis for the 
expectation and the legal imposition of a duty." Palka, 634 N.E.2d at 
192; see also Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that 
some assumed risk is actually a question of duty, not an affirmative 
defense). Duty in New York, in other words, has often served its more 
historic role of a liability-limiting tool, and this function has been 
explicitly policy based. 
33. NORTH CAROLINA 
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court, following Prosser, 
acknowledges that duty is relational, Pinnix v. Toomey, 87 S.E.2d 893, 
897 (N.C. 1955), that Court has not embraced a Prosser (Green) policy 
consideration approach. And, in one recent case, that Court rejected the 
balancing test set forth in Biakanja. Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, 
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Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609, 617 (N.C. 1988) ("[T]he Biakanja 
test is difficult to apply. It requires that the 'moral blame' of the 
defendant and 'the policy of preventing future harm' be considered in 
determining whether the defendant should be held liable. These factors 
are not capable of precise application and seem to add little to an 
assessment of whether a defendant violated a particular duty of care."). 
Yet even in rejecting Biakanja, that court engaged in a balancing process 
of its own. Id. at 617-18. 
34. NORTH DAKOTA 
North Dakota considers foreseeability to be important to discerning the 
existence of a duty. Sime v. Tvenge Associates Architects & Planners, 
P.C., 488 N.W.2d 606, 610 n.7 (N.D. 1992) ("The modern approach to 
discerning whether or not a duty exists generally rests on questions of 
foreseeability of harm .... ") (citing 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 4 (1966); 
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 93 (5th ed. 1984)); accord McLean v. Kirby Co., 490 N.W.2d 229,234 
(N.D. 1992) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 510 (5th ed. 1984)). 
35. OHIO 
Following Prosser, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: 
There is no formula for ascertaining whether a duty exists. Duty "is the court's 
'expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the 
law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection' . . .. Any 
number of considerations may justify the imposition of duty in particular 
circumstances, including the guidance of history, our continually refined 
concepts of morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and social judgment 
as to where the loss should fall .... " 
Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ohio 1989) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 39 (Cal. 
1975) (itself quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS, at 325-26 (4th ed. 1972) and citing William 
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953))); see also 
Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Center., 673 N.E.2d 
1311 (Ohio 1997). Moreover, in Ohio duty depends upon foreseeability 
and upon the relationship of the parties. See Simmers v. Bentley 
Construction Co., 597 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ohio 1992); Huston v. 
Konieczny, 556 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Ohio 1990). 
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Oklahoma has been inspired by Prosser and to a certain extent by 
California factors. Oklahoma accepts "that the existence of a duty 
depends on the relationship between the parties and the general risks 
involved in the common undertaking." Wofford v. E. State Hospital, 795 
P.2d 516, 519 (Okla. 1990); see also Delbrel v. Doenges Bros. Ford 
Inc., 913 P.2d 1318, 1320 (Okla. 1996). In Wofford, a case following 
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 
1976), the Oklahoma Supreme Court quoted extensively from PROSSER 
· & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
& KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1964), and adopted the 
notion that duty is a question of whether a plaintiff's interests are 
entitled to protection. And, further, that duty is not sacrosanct, but the 
expression of considerations of policy. 795 P.2d at 519; see also 
Delbrel, 913 P.2d at 1320-21. Specifically following Tarasoff on this 
point, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has determined that "[t]he most 
important consideration in establishing duty is foreseeability." Delbrel, 
913 P.2d at 1321; see also Wofford, 795 P.2d at 519. However, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court has not adopted ( or rejected) the other factors 
used by the California Supreme Court in Tarasoff. 
37. OREGON 
In recent times Oregon has extensively analyzed questions of duty and 
negligence liability. The status of duty and negligence liability in 
Oregon is unusually complex and has been heavily discussed. See, e.g., 
Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Division, 853 P.2d 798 (Or. 1993); 
Kenneth J. O'Connell, Ruminations on Oregon Negligence Law, 24 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 385 (1988); Robert-E. Lawrence-Berry, Note, The 
Proper Judicial Role in Negligence Actions: The Fazzolari Trilogy 
Redefines "Negligence," 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 443 (1988); Caroline 
A. Porell, Replacing Pragmatism and Policy with Analysis and Analogy: 
Justice Linde's Contribution to Oregon Tort Law, 70 OR. L. REV. 815 
(1991). The discussion·continues to evolve, particularly with respect to 
the proper role of the judge and jury. See Buchler v. Oregon Correc-
tions Division, 853 P.2d 798 (Or. 1993) (determining that as a matter of 
law a harm did not result from any risk of harm unreasonably created by 
defendant); Fuhrer v. Gearhart-By-the-Sea, Inc., 760 P.2d 874 (Or. 
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1988) (holding that with no knowledge or reason to know of a danger-
ous condition, defendant could not foresee unreasonable risk of harm 
and, therefore, claim was dismissed as a matter of law). 
In 1987 the Oregon Supreme Court decided three cases which have 
since provided the starting point for the analysis of duty, foreseeability 
and liability in negligence. Fazzolari v. Portland School District No. 11, 
734 P.2d 1326 (Or. 1987); Kimbler v. Stillwell, 734 P.2d 1344 (Or. 
1987), overruled by Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Division, 853 P.2d 
798 (Or. 1993); Donaca v. Curry County, 734 P.2d 1339 (Or. 1987). 
After extensively reviewing the development of Oregon negligence law 
and secondary sources on duty and negligence liability, see, e.g., 
Fazzolari, 734 P.2d at 1332-36, the Oregon Supreme Court placed heavy 
emphasis on foreseeability in determining liability and noted the largely 
negative use of "duty" to limit liability. As such, that court 
held that the concept of duty was not always a useful tool with which to 
analyze common-law negligence. There may be specific duties established by 
statute, status or relationship, but the absence of such duties does not insulate 
a defendant from liability. In the absence of a duty arising from a source of 
that kind, a defendant may be liable for conduct which is unreasonable in the 
circumstances if that conduct results in harm to a plaintiff and the risk of harm 
to the plaintiff or the class of persons to whom the plaintiff belongs was 
foreseeable. 
Fuhrer, 760 P.2d at 877. A critical feature of the Oregon approach is 
that it reshapes the role of the factfinding process in determining 
liability: "duty," as such, is in general not a liability limiting tool. 10 
Thus, 
[t]he role of the court is what it ordinarily is in cases involving the evaluation 
of particular situations under broad and imprecise standards: to determine 
whether upon the facts alleged or the evidence presented no reasonable 
factfinder could decide one or more elements of liability for one or the other 
party. 
Id. at 1336; see also Buchler, 853 P.2d at 809. Judge Linde's opinion 
in F azzolari viewed this in light of giving "a wide leeway" to the jury. 
Fazzolari, 734 P.2d at 1336 (quoting Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 
469 P.2d 783, 785 (Or. 1970)). Further, Justice Peterson has described 
10. This is not to say that Justice Linde did not forsee some liability limiting role 
of duty: 
[U]nless the parties invoke a status, a relationship, or a particular standard of 
conduct that creates, defines, or limits the defendant's duty, the issue of 
liability for harm actually resulting from defendant's conduct properly depends 
on whether that conduct unreasonably created a foreseeable risk to a protected 
interest of the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff. 
Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. lJ, 734 P.2d 1326, 1336 (Or. 1987). 
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this approach as "limiting the role of the judge in controlling the 
submission to a jury of questions concerning foreseeability." Buchler, 
853 P.2d at 809 (Peterson, J., concurring) (criticizing Fazzolari). 
Nonetheless, in recent cases, the Oregon Supreme Court has demonstrat"" 
ed its willingness to consider matters of negligence in ways that limit the 
role of the jury. See Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Division, 853 P.2d 
798 (Or. 1993); Fuhrer v. Gearhart-By-the-Sea, Inc., 760 P.2d 874 (Or. 
1988). . 
In crafting its unique approach to negligence law, Oregon was 
specifically aware of Prosser (Green)'s positions on duty (and thus the 
idea that duty is based upon a calculus of considerations), Fazzolari, 734 
P.2d at 1335, and California policy factors, Donaca, 734 P.2d at 1342 
& n.4. Although, Oregon rejects the Prosser (Green) approach at least 
in part, 11 its practice must be seen in context. As Justice Linde stated: 
There is nothing new in the observation that "duty" is only a conclusion 
embodying policies making a defendant civilly liable for failure to protect a 
plaintiff against an injury ... This is self-evident when "duty" is used in its 
primary and meaningful sense of obligations imposed or defined by sources of 
law external to the common law of negligence itself . . . . And, of course, 
negligence law itself like all law is a part of a state's public policy. Some 
courts and theorists therefore. have taken the further step that in the absence of 
statutory sources of public policy, a court should articulate and justify rules of 
law in terms of policy (described a bit self-servingly as "public" or "social" 
policy), in other words, adopt a legislative mode of making policy rather than 
a judicial search for policy made by others or for the implications of existing 
principles . . . . [W]e have not embraced free wheeling judicial "policy 
declarations" . . . . 
Donaca, 734 P.2d at 1342 (citations omitted). As such Justice Linde 
noted a variety of factors which the Oregon Supreme Court had refused 
to consider in ·recent cases, including the burden on the courts and 
liability insurance. Id. at 1342-43. Justice Linde's explicit rejection of 
"freewheeling" policy declarations in favor of a search for "principles," 
however Dworkin-like, 12 should not be confused with judicial conserva-
tism or rule formalism. Indeed, Justice Linde's approach allowing 
most or more cases to go to a jury is one which would systematically 
expose defendants to greater liability. Specifically, Justice Linde's anti-
judicial policy statements expressed in Donaca were made in the context 
11. • Oregon continues to look to legislative policy ·in some decisions. See Buchler 
v. Oregon Corrections Division, 853 P.2d 798, 809 (Or. 1993). 
12. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 6 (1977). 
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of rejecting policy analysis which would have limited liability. Donaca, 
734 P.2d at 1342-44. 
38. PENNSYLVANIA 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has looked to Prosser and case law 
for guidance with respect to the "nebulous" concept of duty. See 
Mindala v. American Motors Corp., 543 A.2d 520, 524 (Pa. 1988) 
(quoting Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1979); 
William Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1953)). 
According to that court: "The concept of duty amounts to no more than 
'the sum total of those considerations of policy which led the law to say 
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection' from the harm 
suffered." Majestic by Majestic v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 641 
A.2d 295, 297 (Pa. 1994) (Montemuro, J., dissenting) (quoting Gardner 
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 573 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. 1990)). 
Pennsylvania has also acknowledged that duty is relational: "Duty in 
any given situation is predicated on the relationship between the parties 
at the relevant time .... " Majestic by Majestic, 641 A.2d at 298; 
Mindala, 543 A.2d at 524; Morena v. South Hills Health System, 462 
A.2d 680, 684 (Pa. 1983). 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, quoting Prosser, acknowledges that 
duty exists when a court says it does, Gardner, 573 A.2d at 1020, Sinn 
v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (Pa. 1979), and has looked to Prosser's 
Palsgraf Revisited, supra, for the factors which influence duty: "'[t]he 
hand· of history, our ideas of .morals and justice, the convenience of 
administration of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the loss 
should fall. In the end the court will decide whether there is a duty on 
the basis of the mores of the community . . . . "' Sinn, 404 A.2d at 681 
(quoting William Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L·. REV. 1, 14-15 
(1953)); see also Gardner, 573 A.2d at 1020. Similarly, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania has stated that "in reviewing whether a duty exists 
the court must determine the relationship between the parties and balance 
the various competing interests and costs involved in providing the 
requested protection. This requires a determination of the probability of 
harm in conjunction with the inconvenience of acting to prevent that 
harm." Mindala, 543 A.2d at 524. One justice, sitting by designation 
and dissenting, noted factors other courts have emphasized and also 
made reference to a list of factors which are derivative of factors used 
in California cases. Majestic by Majestic, 641 A.2d at 298 (Montemuro, 
J., dissenting) (citing 57 AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 87 (1989) and 
citations in support thereof, including Thompson v. County of Alameda, 
614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980)). 
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In analyzing questions of duty, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
been influenced by several Prosser (Green) notions and by Andrews' 
dissent in Palsgraf First, the Rhode Island Supreme Court "has 
recognized the difficulty of crafting a workable test to determine whether 
a duty exists in a particular case." Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 
685 (R.I. 1994); see also Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1050 
(R.1. 1994); D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524, 527 (R.I. 1975). 
Since D'Ambra, that court has acknowledged that 
the problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence and that no 
universal test for it has ever been formulated. It is a shorthand statement of a 
conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself ... '[D]uty' is not sacrosanct 
in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of 
policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to 
protection. 
D'Ambra, 338 A.2d at 527 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
& KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971)); see also 
Marchetti, 638 A.2d at 1050. The Rhode Island Supreme Court is also 
influenced by Justice Andrews' dissent .in Palsgraf to the effect that 
public policy plays a strong hand in determining duty/proximate 
causation and liability. See Marchetti, 638 A.2d at 1050; D'Ambra, 338 
A.2d at 527. 
Second, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has specifically determined 
to retain an open-ended approach to which factors to use in a given 
instance. In Ferreira, the court stated that it "has avoided 'definitely 
commit[ting] itself to [a specific] ... analytical approach' and has 
instead adopted an ad hoc approach of considering all relevant factors." 
636 A.2d at 685 (quoting D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524, 527, 
528 (R.I. 1975)). Thus, D'Ambra, in a moment obviously influenced by 
Green, looked to "three basic categories [of policy issues]: moral, 
economic and administrative." D'Ambra, 338 A.2d at 528. And 
although the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated five factors in Banks 
v. Bowen's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.1. 1987) (an unusual 
case involving landowner duties), it later clarified that "those factors 
were case specific and should not be taken or construed to limit the 
scope of factors that we shall consider in future cases involving different 
factual situations." Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 685 n.2. The court has 
deliberately chosen to keep the use of factors open to ad hoc determina-
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tion and has not chosen to follow a repeating pattern or patterns of 
factors. 
40. SOUTH CAROLINA 
Apart from acknowledging that duty is an essential element in a 
negligence case, see, . e.g., Rogers v . . South Carolina Department. of 
Parole and Community Corrections, 464 S.E.2d 330, 332 (S.C. 1995), 
and discussions of particular "duties" owed, see id. ( discussing duty to 
control or warn of another's dangerous conduct) and Degenhart v. 
Knights of Columbus, 420 S.E.2d 495, 496 (S.C. 1992) (discussing 
employer's duty to act and protect), there has been little analysis of 
abstract or general matters of duty in South Carolina to date. -
41. SOUTH DAKOTA 
South Dakota has recognized that duty can arise from various sources, 
including public policy: "A noncontractual duty may be imposed by 
common law, statute, implication or operation of law, public policy, or 
from a failure to exercise that care which a reasonable person would 
exercise under like circumstances." F & M Agency v. Dombush, 402 
N.W.2d 353, 356-57 (S.D. 1987) (citing 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 4(7) 
(1966); 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965). Citing W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 56, at 374 (5th ed. 1984), the South Dakota Supreme Court acknowl-
edges that "social policy" may justify liability for non-feasance. F & M 
Agency, 402 N.W.2d at 357. 
In addition to being influenced by Prosser's notion that duty involves 
social policy, the South Dakota Supreme Court has chosen to define duty 
in light of a particular standard of conduct. Id. at 356 ( quoting W. PAGE 
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 53, at 
356 (5th ed. 1984)). 
42. TENNESSEE 
Tennessee has been heavily influenced by Prosser in its analysis of 
duty and has looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for factors 
determining whether or not a risk is unreasonable. In Tennessee, duty 
is an "essential element in all negligence cases," see McCall v. Wilder, 
913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995), even though it was not so in early 
English common law. Id.; Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W2d 865, 869 
(Tenn. 1993). Following Prosser on the point that duty is not sacrosanct, 
but reflecting considerations of policy, the Tennessee Supreme Court has 
held that "the imposition of a legal duty reflects society's contemporary 
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policies and social requirements concerning the right of individuals and 
the general public to be protected from another's act or conduct." 
Bradshaw, 854 S.W.2d at 870 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 358 (5th ed. 1984); 
William Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953)); see 
also Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 625 (Tenn. 1997); McClung v. 
Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn. 1996). In 
addition, following Prosser, the Tennessee Supreme Court has considered 
duty in terms of the relation between the parties and in light of interests 
which may be entitled to legal protection. Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 
S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tenn. 1994) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 37, at 236 (5th ed. 
1984)); Bradshaw, 854 S.W.2d at 869-70. 
Because Tennessee considers duty in light of unreasonable and 
foreseeable risk of harm, McCall, 913 S.W.2d at 153, it has analyzed 
factors determining whether a risk is unreasonable. Id. In that analysis, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court has looked to factors set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291, 292, 293 (1964)). 
43. TEXAS 
Texas has not expressly turned to California for guidance on questions 
of duty, but its approach to questions of duty is compatible with a 
Prosser (Green) approach and shares some familiar features with 
California. As Prosser (Green) asserted, the Texas Supreme Court states 
that "[d]eciding whether to impose a new common-law duty involves 
complex considerations of public policy." Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 
918, 920 (Tex. 1993); see also Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 
S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tex. 1995) (also acknowledging that Texas will look 
to other jurisdictions and respected authorities and restatements for 
guidance in duty questions); William W. ·Kilgarlin & Sandra Sterba-
Boatwright, The Recent Evolution of Duty in Texas, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 
241, 245 (1986). 
Texas considers a variety of factors in determining duty, although (as 
in California) foreseeability remains the most significant. Mitchell v. 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 786 S.W.2d 659,662 (Tex. 1990); 
Genell, Inc. v. Flynn, 358 S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (Tex. 1990). Among the 
factors considered by the Texas courts are '"social, economic, and 
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political questions,' and their application to the particular facts at hand." 
Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 662 (quoting l TEXAS TORTS AND REMEDIES 
§ 1.03[2] (1989)); see also Graff, 858 S.W.2d at 920. In addition, the 
Texas Supreme Court has considered "the extent of the risk involved, 
'the foreseeability and likelihood of injury weighed against the social 
utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding 
against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on .the 
defendant.'" Graff, 858 S.W. 2d at 920 (quoting Greater Houston 
Transportation Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990)); see 
also Mitchell, 786 S.W.2d at 662. Although Texas does not adopt 
California factors as such, the factors it has relied upon significantly 
overlap those used by California courts. 
44. UTAH 
In recent cases the Utah Supreme Court has followed the Prosser 
(Green) position that duty is an expression of considerations of policy. 
Utah has considered a variety of factors, but has not looked specifically 
to California factors. 
The Utah Supreme Court asserts that 
it is meaningless to speak of ... "duties" in the abstract. These terms are only 
labels which the legal system applies to defined situations to indicate that 
certain rights and obligations flow from them; they are "an expression of the 
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a 
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986) (quoting 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 333 (3d ed. 
1964)) (citations omitted); accord Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 
138 (3d. Cir. 1979) (quoting same); see also Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 237 (Utah 1993); Debry v. Valley Mortgage Co., 
835 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing and quoting Tarasoff 
v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (on 
duty)); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Utah 1991). 
Utah has looked at a variety of factors, often specific to the issue at 
hand, see Beach, 726 P.2d at 418-20, including, in cases involving a 
duty to control a dangerous person or to warn or protect a potential 
victim, "the identity and character of the actor, the victim, and the 
victimizer, the relationship of the actor to the victim and the victimizer, 
and the practical impact that finding a special relationship would have." 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237. Generally, the Utah Supreme Court has been 
concerned with the 
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consequences of imposing that duty for the parties and for society ... [ and has 
been] loath to recognize a duty that is realistically incapable of performance or 
fundamentally at odds with the nature of, the_parties'. rt:lationship. 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237 (citations omitted); see also Beach, 726 P.2d 
at 418. 
Utah has relied upon policy-based reasoning to reach conservative, no 
duty results, see Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) 
(denying duty to college students), and to tailor liability, see Higgins v. 
Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993) (adopting a narrow 
approach to Tarasoff duties). 
45. VERMONT 
Following Prosser, the Vermont Supreme Court has stated that "the 
imposition of a duty is 'an expression of the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is 
entitled to protection."' O'Connell v. Killington, 665 A.2d 39, 42 (Vt. 
1995) (quoting Denis Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 622 A.2d 495, 499 (Vt. 
1993) (itself quoting w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 358 (5th_ ed. 1984))); see also Sabia v. 
State, 669 A.2d 1187, 1191 (Vt. 1995); Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 
1301, 1305 (Vt. 1986) (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 
1968)). Although it has not adopted any universal list of appropriate 
factors, in determining duties owed by governmental bodies, the 
Vermont Supreme Court has repeatedly referenced a specific list of 
factors which it borrowed from the Minnesota Supreme Court. Sabia, 
669 A.2d at 1191; Denis Bail Bond, 622 A.2d at 499 (citing Cracraft v. 
City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806-07 (Minn. 1979)). And, 
in a case involving the question of whether or not to impose social host 
liability, the Vermont Supreme Court made favorable reference to 
California factors Langle, 510 A.2d at 1304. 
46. VIRGINIA 
In recent times the Virginia Supreme Court has remained rooted in the 
past. Recognizing that duty is essential to a plaintiff's case, it has 
emphasized the importance of a plaintiff being in a protected class. See 
Dudley v. Offender Aid and Restoration of Richmond, Inc., 401 S.E.2d 
878, 882-83 (Va. 1991) (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 
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N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § '281 (1965). 
Thus, in Virginia, "there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract, 
or in general .... Negligence must be in relation to some person." 
Kent v. Miller, 189 S.E. 332, 334 (Va. 1937); see also Dudley, 401 
S.E.2d at 882; Marshall v. Winston, 389 S.E.2d 902, 905 (Va. 1990). 
Thus, there has been very little general or abstract discussion of duty 
by the Virginia Supreme court, which has preferred to view duty in 
specific relational terms, focusing upon the "scope of the duty" and the 
"circumstances of the particular case." Dudley, 401 S.E.2d at 883. The 
Virginia Supreme Court has not adopted a Prosser (Green) approach and 
has only made passing reference to policies which may be used in its 
duty determinations. See id.; see also Marshall, 389 S.E.2d at 905. 
45. WASHINGTON 
The Washington Supreme Court has been influenced by Prosser 
(Green) notions. In arecent decision, the Washington Supreme Court 
cast a question of duty in terms of policy, pointing to the Prosser & 
Keeton treatises for guidance. Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue 
Associates, 802 P.2d 1360, 1362-71 (Wash. 1991). Implicitly following 
Prosser, that court has stated that "[u]ltimately, the policy question is one 
of fairness under contemporary standards." Id. at 1371 (citing Hunsley 
v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1976) (quoting William Prosser, 
Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953))). Further, following 
Prosser, the Washington Supreme Court has considered duty in light of 
a·balancing of interests. See Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Avenue Associ-
ates, 802 P.2d 1360 (Wash. 1991); Hunsley v. Giard, 553 P.2d 1096, 
1102 (Wash. 1976); Chappel v. Franklin Pierce School District, No. 402, 
426 P.2d 471 (Wasli. 1967). . 
Washington puts great emphasis on foreseeability: "foreseeability 
determines the scope of the duty owed." Hansen v. Friend, 824 P.2d 
483, 487 (Wash. 1992); Christen v. Lee, 780 P.2d 1307, 1313 (Wash. 
1989) (considering a number of factors). Obviating the need for 
considering general · policy concerns in . a wide number of cases, 
Washington views foreseeability normally as a question for the finder of 
fact, usually the jury. Hansen, 824 P.2d at 487. However, in the 
context of determining an attorney's duty to non-clients, the Washington 
Supreme Court has analyzed questions of duty in light of a hybrid of the 
multi-factor balancing test first used in California. Trask v. Butler, 872 
P.2d 1080, 1084 (Wash. 1994); Strangland v. Brock, 747 P.2d 464, 467 
(Wash. 1987) (citing Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961)); 
Bowman v. Two, 704 P.2d 140, 143 (Wash. 1985). 
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The West Virginia Supreme Court engaged'in'an extensive analysis of 
duty in Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 566-68 (W. Va. 1983). 
That analysis drew heavily upon Prosser (Green), Palsgraf, and 
California Supreme Court decisions. Casting duty in evolutionary terms, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court noted that "[t]hroughout the history of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence the concept of duty in tort law has 
evolved in response to the social aims of civilized society." Robertson, 
301 S.E.2d at 566. Perceiving that, historically "duty existed to act 
with care towards all others," id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 4, 53 (4th ed. 1971)), 
Robertson stated that during the industrial revolution duty began to be 
used as a device to limit defendants' liability. Id. (citing same). 
Robertson asserted, however, that the "pro-defendant bias" has steadily 
eroded with a shift in emphasis towards compensation. Id. Robertson 
regarded "[t]he California Supreme Court [as] ... the vanguard of the 
modem trend to expand the concept of duty in tort cases." Id. (citing 
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Rowland_ v. Christian, 443 
P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)). . . . 
Following the California lead, West Virginia has put special emphasis 
on foreseeability of injury. Id. at 567; Miller v. Whitworth, 455 S.E.2d 
821, 824-25 (W. Va. 1995). In addition to foreseeability, "the existence 
of duty also involves policy considerations underlying the core issue of 
the scope of the legal system's protections." Robertson, 301 s:E.2d at 
568 (citations omitted). In this vein, West Virginia has articulated some 
policy factors: "such considerations include the likelihood of injury, the 
magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of 
placing the burden on the defendant.''. Id. at 568 (citing Rowland v. 
Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)); Miller, 455 S.E.2d at 825. It has 
acknowledged also that "[o]ther broader policy considerations also enter 
the equation, but they are not so readily articulated." Robertson 301 
S.E.2d at 568 (citing Prosser (Green): Leon Green, Duties, Risks, 
Causation Doctrines, 41 TEX. L. REV. 42, 45 (1962); WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971)). 
In the vein of keeping an open-ended approach to policy factors, the 
West Virginia Supreme Court has been willing to consider ad hoc 
questions of policy. Courtney v. Courtney, 413 S.E.2d 418, 426-28 (W. 
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Va. 1991) (considering public policy questions in the context of inter-
family immunities); Overbaugh v. McCutcheon, 396 S.E.2d 153, 158 
(W. Va. 1990) (considering but respecting social host liability in light of 
public policy rationales). 
49. WISCONSIN 
Without overt reliance on the Prosser (Green) approach as such, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court follows an approach to liability and duty 
which is a compatible variation. Wisconsin's approach is quite similar 
to the California approach, but Wisconsin uses its own set of policy 
factors. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court puts heavy emphasis on foreseeability 
in determining duty and liability, Rockweit By Donohue v. Senecal, 541 
N.W.2d 742, 747 (Wis. 1995), which that court believes is in the 
tradition of Justice Andrews' position in Palsgraf Id; see also 
Schilling v. Stockel, 133 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Wis. 1965); Klassa v. 
Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 77 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Wis. 1956); Pfeifer v. 
Standard Gateway Theatre, Inc., 55 N.W.2d 29, 34 (Wis. 1952). 
Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159 (Wis. 1988), has determined 
the structure of duty/liability analysis in Wisconsin. According to 
Schuster, "A defendant's duty is established when it can be said that it 
was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to 
someone. A party is negligent when he commits an act when some 
harm to someone is foreseeable." Schuster, 424·N.W.2d at 164 (quoting 
A.E. Investment Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764 (Wisc. 
1974)); see also Rolph v. EBI Companies, 464 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Wis. 
1991). 
Public policy is important to liability in Wisconsin, but in a negative 
way once foreseeability is established. See Rolph, 464 N.W.2d at 672. 
Once an act involving· foreseeable harm has been committed, which in 
fact causes harm to someone, a Wisconsin court, in terms of proximate 
causation, can make a legal finding of non-liability based on public 
policy factors. Id.; Schuster, 424 N:W.2d at 164; Morgan v. Pennsylva-
nia General Insurance Co., 275 N.W.2d 660,664 (Wis. 1979); Schilling, 
133 N.W.2d at 339. "Duty"· is otherwise not relevant. Rolph, 464 
N.W.2d at 672; Schilling v. Stockel, 133 N.W.2d 335 (Wis. 1965). 
Wisconsin has stated that for public policy to trump the imposition of 
liability, the imposition of liability must "shock the conscience of 
society." Pfeifer, 55 N.W.2d at 34; see also Rolph, 464 N.W.2d at 672-
73; Schilling, 133 N.W.2d at 339. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has 
stated that the following public policy facts are helpful in determining 
whether to so limit liability: 
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"(l) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly 
out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in 
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have 
brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too 
unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or (5) because allowance of 
recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) 
allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping 
point." 
Rolph, 464 N.W. 2d at 673; see also Schuster, 424 N.W.2d at 167; 
Coffey v. Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 140 (Wis. 1976). 
In addition, in two cases predating Schuster, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court relied upon the California multi-factor or balancing test, articulated 
in Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961), in determining the 
liability of a lawyer to a non-client in a will drafting scenario. See 
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Wis. 1987); 
Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Wis. 1983). 
50. WYOMING 
Wyoming relies upon the Prosser (Green) approach and has explicitly 
adopted California factors from Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). Following and quoting Prosser, 
the Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the idea that duty is not 
sacrosanct, but the sum total of policy considerations. Gates v. 
Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54, at 357-58 (5th ed. 
1984)). The Wyoming Supreme Court has also, following Prosser, 
considered questions of duty in light of the relations of the parties and 
interests to be protected. Pickle v. Board of County Commissioners, 764 
P.2d 262, 265 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER,HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 37, at 206 (4th ed. 1971)). 
Acknowledging that there is no "scientific formula" for determining 
duty, id. at 265, and that the list of considerations is open-ended, Gates, 
719 P.2d at 196, the Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the list of 
policy factors used by the California Supreme Court in Tarasoff. Ortega 
v. Flaim, 902 P.2d 199, 203 & n.3 (Wyo. 1995); Pickle, 764 P.2d at 
265; Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Wyo. 
1987); Gates, 719 P.2d at 196. 
In a recent case, Ortega, the Supreme Court of Wyoming refused to 
abrogate a common law rule and noted in so doing that the party seeking 
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to change the rule failed to "analyze these factors or provide a record for 
an analysis," 902 P.2d at 204, but instead only offered a court decision 
to argue for a modem trend. Id. Affirming its commitment to the 
factors and to argumentation based upon them, the court admonished that 
"such a change cannot be based solely upon a trend, but rather must be 
based upon relevant data and analysis which supports the legal, social 
and/or economic theories behind abrogating the common law." Id. 
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